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ABSTRACT
Regime design choices in international law turn on empirical claims about how states behave and
under what conditions their behavior changes. We suggest that a central problem for human rights
regimes is how best to socialize “bad actors” to incorporate globally legitimated models of state
behavior and how to get “good actors” to do better. Substantial empirical evidence suggests three
distinct mechanisms whereby states and institutions might influence the behavior of other states:
coercion, persuasion, and acculturation. Several structural impediments preclude full
institutionalization of coercion- and persuasion-based regimes in human rights law. Yet,
inexplicably these models of social influence predominate in international legal studies. In this
Article, we first describe in some detail the salient conceptual features of each mechanism of
social influence. We then link each of the identified mechanisms to specific regime design
characteristics—identifying several ways in which acculturation might occasion a rethinking of
fundamental regime design problems in human rights law. Through a systematic evaluation of
three design problems—conditional membership, precision of obligations, and enforcement
methods—we elaborate an alternative way to conceive of regime design problems. We maintain
that (1) acculturation is a conceptually distinct social process through which state behavior is
influenced; and (2) the regime design recommendations issuing from this approach defy
conventional wisdom in international human rights scholarship. This exercise not only
recommends reexamination of policy debates in human rights law; it also provides a conceptual
framework within which the costs and benefits of various design principles might be assessed. Our
aim is to improve the understanding of how norms operate in international society with a view to
improving the capacity of global and domestic institutions to harness the processes through which
human rights cultures are built.

Can international law substantially help to reduce human rights violations? Must an
international human rights regime1 include strong enforcement mechanisms to be
effective? Or can abstract considerations of legitimacy and shame induce governments
not to oppress their citizens? At bottom, these questions are essentially empirical in
nature. Addressing them requires nothing short of understanding the behavioral logic that
guides state practice—whether states (and individuals) might be influenced by rewards
and penalties, the power of persuasion, and concerns about status. These broad issues also
imply a series of more specific regime design questions. Should the relevant rules apply
equally to powerful and weak states? Should international regimes encourage the
participation of states with good human rights records, poor human rights records, or
both? These regime design choices also turn on empirical claims about how the diffusion
of norms occurs, how groups interact, and the conditions under which actors cooperate.
Put differently, how international law affects state behavior has significant implications
for how human rights regimes should be designed.

1
Drawing on international relations literature, we use the concept of “regime” to refer to the formal and
informal aspects of a regulatory environment. See Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime
Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1, 2 (Stephen .D. Krasner ed.,
1983) (“Regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making
procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations.”).
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In this Article, we claim that debates about how best to design international regimes
should be closely tethered to empirical debates about how best to socialize outlier states
into international society and how to induce liberal states to perform better. In short,
questions of design must be married to empirical questions of state behavior. In
furtherance of that objective, this Article seeks to develop a theory of the empirical
foundations of regime design principles.
The character of human rights regimes suggests productive avenues of investigation.
Most international regimes seek to facilitate cooperation or coordination between states.
The global promotion of human rights is importantly different from both types of
regimes. 2 The prevalence of human rights violations is not reducible to a simple
collective action problem. First, states have substantial capacity to promote and protect
human rights within their territory without coordinating their efforts with other states.
Without question, states retain some substantial measure of effective autonomy in this
issue area. Second, many states have no interest in promoting and protecting human
rights. That is, some states are willing to violate human rights when it is convenient to do
so—and have no interest in accepting structural commitments that might alter their
current decision processes. Indeed, one of the central regime design problems in human
rights law is how best to influence “bad actors” to make fundamental changes. The
question whether international law can promote human rights norms might be recast, in
an important sense, as how human rights regimes can best harness the mechanisms of
social influence.
This task is further complicated by several structural characteristics of international
society that undercut the potential effectiveness of some strategies. Consider two. First,
international human rights norms are not self-enforcing. This point issues from the fact
that human rights regimes do not address coordination problems and that states have no
clear, direct interest in securing human rights protection in other states. Second, goodfaith regime participants are generally unwilling or unable to shoulder the enforcement
costs necessary to coerce recalcitrant states to comply with human rights norms
(associated with such measures as economic sanctions, armed force, and harsh diplomatic
pressure). This “enforcement deficit”—reinforced by high enforcement costs and
negligible direct returns—is a political reality of the current international order.
The increasing exchange between international relations scholarship and international
legal scholarship illuminates some of these difficulties and offers useful insights on how
best to address them. 3 Indeed, research projects in international relations now focus on
2

These distinctive features are well understood. See, e.g., Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of International
Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe, 54 INT’L ORG. 217, 217 (2000) (“These
arrangements differ from most other forms of institutionalized international cooperation in both their ends
and their means. Unlike international institutions governing trade, monetary, environmental, or security
policy, international human rights institutions are not designed primarily to regulate policy externalities
arising from societal interactions across borders, but to hold governments accountable for purely internal
activities. In contrast to most international regimes, moreover, human rights regimes are not generally
enforced by interstate action.”); see also JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC POSNER, A THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW (forthcoming 2005) (chapter on International Human Rights Law).
3
See, e.g., Kal Raustiala & Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law, International Relations and
Compliance, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Walter Carlsnaes, et al. eds., 2002); Anne-Marie
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theoretical and empirical issues concerning human rights and state practice.4 And, this
research has begun to influence legal analysis of international human rights regimes.5
This ground-breaking “first generation” of empirical international legal studies
demonstrated that international law “matters.” Nevertheless, the existing literature has not
adequately accounted for the regime design implications of this research. Regime design
debates (both substantive and procedural) often turn on unexamined or undefended
empirical assumptions about foundational matters such as: the conditions under which
external pressure can influence state behavior, which social or political forces are
potentially effective, and the relationship between state preferences and material and
ideational structure at the global level. Moreover, prevailing approaches to these
problems are predicated on a thin and under-specified conception of the mechanisms for
influencing state practice. What is needed is a “second generation” of empirical
international legal studies aimed at clarifying the mechanics of law’s influence. This
“second generation,” in our view, should generate concrete, empirically falsifiable
propositions about the role of law in state preference formation and transformation.
In short, “first generation” scholarship in international human rights law provides an
indispensable but plainly incomplete framework. Prevailing approaches suggest that law
changes human rights practices by either: (1) coercing states (and individuals) to comply
with regime rules;6 or (2) persuading states (and individuals) of the validity and
legitimacy of human rights law.7 In our view, the former fails to grasp the complexity of
Slaughter, International Law and International Relations, 285 RECUEIL DES COURS (2001). Anne-Marie
Slaughter et al., International Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of
Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 367 (1998).
4
See Hans Peter Schmitz & Kathryn Sikkink, International Human Rights, in HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note __, at 517 (offering a survey of the existing literature).
5
See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, The Cost Of Commitment, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1821 (2003); Oona A.
Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make A Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935 (2002); Laurence R. Helfer,
Overlegalizing Human Rights, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1832 (2002); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey
International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997); Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a
Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273 (1997). We have previously utilized this
frame in analyzing other aspects of human rights law. Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Measuring the Effects
of Human Rights Treaties, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 171 (2003); Ryan Goodman, Human Rights Treaties, Invalid
Reservations, and State Consent, 96 AM. J. INT’L L.531 (2002).
6
An important strand of international legal scholarship accordingly adheres to the coercion model. See,
e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823 (2002);
Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Symposium on Rational Choice and International Law, Moral and
Legal Rhetoric in International Relations: A Rational Choice Perspective, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (2002);
Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make A Difference?, 111 YALE L. J. 1935, 2020 (2002); Jack
Goldsmith, Sovereignty, International Relations Theory, and International Law, 52 STAN. L. REV. 959
(2000); Jack Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV.
1113 (1999).
7
An important strand of international legal scholarship adheres to the persuasion model. See, e.g., Koh,
supra note __, at 2599; Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective
Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273 (1997); THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995); THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990).
Anne-Marie Slaughter’s influential work on transgovernmental networks also relies principally on notions of
persuasion. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Governing the Global Economy Through Government Networks, in
THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 177, 205 (Michael Byers ed., 2000) (describing transgovernmental networks in which “[t]he dominant
currency is engagement and persuasion”); see also Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International
Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT 'L L. 1, 51
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the social environment within which states act; and the latter fails to account for many
ways in which the diffusion of social norms occurs. We contend that a specific body of
interdisciplinary scholarship now requires a reexamination of the empirical foundations
of human rights regimes. Indeed, this robust cluster of empirical studies documents
particular processes whereby states are socialized in the absence of coercion or
persuasion. Put differently, these studies conclude that the power of social influence can
be harnessed even if: (1) the collective action problems that inhibit effective “coercion”
are not overcome; and (2) the complete internalization sought through “persuasion” is not
achieved. 8
Drawing on this burgeoning literature, we provide a more complete conceptual
framework by identifying a third mechanism by which international law might change
state behavior—acculturation. By acculturation, we mean the general process by which
actors adopt the beliefs and behavioral patterns of the surrounding culture. This
mechanism induces behavioral changes through pressures to assimilate—some imposed
by other actors and some imposed by the self. This mechanism encompasses a number of
micro-processes including mimicry, identification, and status-maximization. The
touchstone of this mechanism is that varying degrees of identification with a reference
group generate varying degrees of cognitive and social pressures—real or imagined—to
conform. 9 We do not suggest that international legal scholarship has completely failed to
(2002) (“[W]hen networks promote regulatory change, change occurs more through persuasion than
command.”). Slaughter and Raustiala’s work derives, in significant part, from the school of “managerialism,”
pioneered by Abram and Antonio Chayes. Chayes and Chayes’ project understands persuasion as central. See
ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA CHAYES, NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY
AGREEMENTS 25 (1995) (“[T]he fundamental instrument for maintaining compliance with treaties at an
acceptable level is an iterative process of discourse among the parties, the treaty organization, and the wider
public.”); id. at 26 (“Persuasion and argument are the principal engines of this process…”). Koh’s work
derives more directly from political science scholarship concerning transnational advocacy networks. As
Rodger Payne’s survey of that scholarship explains, “persuasion is considered the centrally important
mechanism for constructing and reconstructing social facts.” Rodger A. Payne, Persuasion, Frames, and
Norm Construction, 7 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 37, 38 (2001).
8
See, e.g., Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Toward an Institutional Theory of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 1749 (2003) (outlining general theoretical model founded on acculturation mechanisms). We should
note that some international legal scholars—most notably Harold Koh—have advanced theories relying in
part on mechanisms that resemble what we have called acculturation. See, e.g., Koh, supra note ___, at 2646
(suggesting that “habitual obedience” is part of the process of norm incorporation). Koh, however, has not
identified what role, if any, global-level acculturation processes might play in his theoretical model. In Koh’s
model, processes that most closely resemble acculturation occur at the final stage of norm implementation;
they are governed primarily by bureaucratic and administrative impulses to follow already accepted legal
rules. See, e.g., id. at 2655; see also Harold Hongju Koh, Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home,
35 HOUS. L. REV. 623, 651-53 (1998) (describing “bureaucratic compliance procedures” as the cause for
habitual compliance). As mentioned above, Koh’s discussion of global-level norm diffusion borrows from
political science scholarship on transnational advocacy networks, which emphasizes the mechanism of
persuasion. See supra note 7. That said, we consider our project an extension of Koh’s and others’ work on
transnational norm diffusion. We intend to supplement that larger constructivist agenda by isolating the
micro-processes of social influence.
9
See, e.g., THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS (Walter W. Powell & Paul J.
DiMaggio eds., 1991); W. RICHARD SCOTT & J OHN W. MEYER, INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTS AND
ORGANIZATIONS (1994); John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure
as Myth and Ceremony, 83 AM. J. SOC. 340 (1977); Lynne G. Zucker, Institutional Theories of Organization,
13 ANN. REV. SOC. 443, 443-64 (1987); Lynne G. Zucker, The Role of Institutionalization in Cultural
Persistence, 42 AM. SOC. REV. 726 (1977).
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identify aspects of this process. Rather we maintain that the mechanism is underemphasized and poorly understood, and that it is often conflated (or even confused) with
other constructivist mechanisms such as persuasion. Differentiating the mechanism of
acculturation—and specifying the micro-processes through which it operates—are
profoundly important, however. Indeed, each of the three mechanisms is likely to have
distinct implications along a number of dimensions including the durability of norms,
patterns of adoption and diffusion, and the depth of compliance.
Additionally, we argue that mechanisms matter for regime design. We link each of
the three mechanisms of social influence to specific regime design characteristics—
identifying several ways in which acculturation might occasion a rethinking of
fundamental design problems in human rights law. In short, we reverse engineer
structural regime design principles from the salient characteristics of underlying social
processes. We maintain that (1) acculturation is a conceptually distinct social mechanism
that influences state behavior; and (2) the regime design recommendations issuing from
this approach defy conventional wisdom in international human rights scholarship. We
contend that, without this understanding, several characteristics of international society
will frustrate regime design models that rely on only coercing and persuading states to
comply with human rights law.
Some careful readers will, no doubt, argue that the best approach to regime design
might incorporate elements of all three mechanisms. On this view, the identified
mechanisms reinforce each other—or, put differently, there is a dynamic relationship
between the mechanisms that is sacrificed by any scheme emphasizing one to the
exclusion of the others. This is an important point; and it is almost certainly correct.
However, the kind of analysis contemplated by this line of criticism (viz. the development
of an integrated theory of regime design that accounts for each mechanism) would, in our
view, first require identification and clear differentiation of these mechanisms. This
conceptual clarification is a first step, which enables subsequent work aimed at
identifying the conditions under which each of the mechanisms would predominate (and
the ways in which each mechanism might reinforce or frustrate the operation of the
others). Moreover, we think it useful to link specific mechanisms to concrete regime
design problems. Doing so illustrates the design features suggested by each and further
clarifies the conceptual commitments of each mechanism. Our analysis of regime design
problems yields three models of human rights regimes built on each of the mechanisms.
But we do not suggest that any regime does or should exhibit all of these features. In this
sense, our application of the mechanisms to regime design issues is offered in the spirit of
10
Max Weber’s “ideal types.” Ideal types are theoretical constructs that model certain
aspects of the social world. These constructs are useful because they serve as the basis for
a particular brand of comparative analysis: By comparing an ideal type with a particular
historical (observable) case, it is possible to determine the extent to which the elements
emphasized in the ideal type occur in reality. In other words, the ideal type is a useful
tool that permits an assessment of the extent to which certain attributes or processes exist
in a particular case.
10
Max Weber, “Objectivity” in Social Science and Social Policy, in THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 49 (Edward A. Shils & Heary A. Finch trans. and eds., 1949).
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The Article proceeds in four parts. In Part I, we outline three mechanisms by which
actors (and their practices) are influenced by other actors and institutions. We emphasize
the conceptual core of each mechanism—analyzing in some detail the ways in which
each is distinct from the others. This exposition also identifies the schools of thought and
research programs that suggest the presence and characteristics of each. We then apply
these three mechanisms to three foundational regime design problems in human rights
law. In Part II, we address the problem of membership—how best to define the regime
community; how best to articulate regime boundaries. We then consider, in Part III, the
ways in which each mechanism would approach the problem of defining the substantive
obligations around which the legal community is built. As an important instance of this
broad problem, we analyze the issue of rule precision—to what extent should precision
be valued in defining prescribed and proscribed conduct. Finally, in Part IV, we discuss
how each mechanism would approach the problem of compliance and effectiveness—
how might regimes directly discourage undesirable behavior and encourage desirable
behavior. In short, we assess the implications of each mechanism for common regime
design problems in human rights law—analyzing the ways in which design
recommendations issue from the underlying theory of social influence.

I. THREE MECHANISMS OF SOCIAL INFLUENCE
What are the mechanisms by which international institutions might exert influence
over recalcitrant states? According to conventional wisdom, there are two ways in which
international law and international regimes change state behavior (if at all): coercion and
persuasion.11 These explanations of state behavior are conceptually coherent, empirically
supported, and important. However, substantial evidence suggests that the two
approaches do not exhaust the ways in which actors and institutions exert influence on
the behavior of others. As discussed briefly in the Introduction, we suggest a third
mechanism: acculturation, whereby conformity is elicited through a range of socialization
processes. We develop the typology further here. First, we discuss in more detail the
character of the typology itself. Then, we describe the attributes of each mechanism. In
this Part, we seek only to model generally the three mechanisms. In the remainder of the
Article, we apply these models to several concrete problems of regime design in human
rights law.
We should make a couple points about the state of the field in international relations
and international law as it pertains to these mechanisms. Extending at least two decades
back, scholars have generally divided into two camps: rationalists and constructivists.
The former emphasizes military-economic power and global material structure while the
latter emphasizes norms and global ideational structure. Despite the considerable
accomplishments of both camps, the micro-processes of social influence are often under11
See, e.g., Moravcsik, supra, note __, at 220 (“Existing scholarship seeking to explain why national
governments establish and enforce formal international human rights norms focuses on two modes of
interstate interaction: coercion and normative persuasion.”).
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specified, under-analyzed, or, at best, under-explained. Several important questions merit
more sustained reflection. For example, how exactly do norms change behavior or
attitudes? Do social sanctions place pressure that must be weighed as a cost against other
interests, or do social sanctions function more as cognitive cues? If one answer to how
norms influence actors is through “persuasion,” what exactly are the micro-processes and
elements by which persuasion works? Our project calls for reorienting the academic
discussion toward such issues of micro-process. We discuss how mechanisms of coercion
and persuasion work, in part, by contrasting them with the third mechanism of
acculturation. We link that discussion to legal rules and legal institutional design. This
latter conceptual move demonstrates why the study of social mechanisms is important
and the range of particular design questions that turn on such a distinction.
Initially, note that these mechanisms are, at bottom, theories of how preferences form
and the conditions under which they change. They vary in their claims about whether,
and the degree to which, international institutions prompt endogenous change in the
preferences and identities of actors. Although this point, so framed, immediately suggests
that our project is linked to ontological debates between rationalists and constructivists in
international relations theory,12 the typology we develop here does not track these
debates. Indeed, many constructivist scholars rely on coercion as a lever of change. These
scholars suggest that norms and ideas matter in international politics in part because they
provide a reservoir of symbolic authority that might, in various ways, be brought to bear
on recalcitrant states. For example, socialization processes might exert direct influence
over third parties (e.g., donor countries), who in turn use traditional coercive techniques
to effect compliance in the target state. In this vein, Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink
argue that transnational activist networks utilize international norms to persuade domestic
audiences to coerce target governments.13 Likewise, many rationalist scholars suggest
that the social context of international institutions (including the attendant structural
opportunities for persuasion and learning) influences the effectiveness of traditional
coercive techniques. For example, Lisa Martin has argued that threats made within a
highly institutionalized environment are more credible because of the greater ‘‘audience
costs’’ in this social setting. 14 And Leonard Schoppa has suggested that coercive tactics
are more effective when they accord with widely shared procedural norms governing
international bargaining.15 Nevertheless, it is fair to say that rationalists emphasize the
coercion mechanism, 16 and constructivists emphasize the persuasion mechanism.17 Two
important points follow from this discussion. First, the rationalist-constructivist debate
concerns matters that are, for the most part, beyond the scope of this Article. The
12

See James Fearon & Alexander Wendt, Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View, in HANDBOOK

OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note __, at 52 (describing those debates).
13
MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS:
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 16-25 (1998).
14
Lisa Martin, Credibility, Costs, and Institutions, 45 WORLD POL. 406 (1993).
15

ADVOCACY NETWORKS

IN

Leonard J. Schoppa, The Social Context in Coercive International Bargaining, 53 INT’L ORG. 307
(1999).
16
See, e.g., Daniel W. Drezner, Introduction: The Interaction of Domestic and International Institutions, in
LOCATING THE PROPER AUTHORITIES: THE INTERACTION OF DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 1,
15-19 (Daniel Drezner, ed. 2003); Alastair Iain Johnston, Treating International Institutions as Social
Environments, 45 INT’L STUD. Q. 487, 489-90 (2001).
17
See, e.g., Payne, supra note __, at 38; Johnston, supra note ___, at 495.
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important point here is that our typology outlines the micro-processes by which actors are
influenced by their social context—without building into these models additional
assumptions about the character of actors. Second, conventional approaches deemphasize, and often ignore, other ways in which institutions and actors influence
others.18
One unfortunate aspect of the prevailing theoretical landscape is that acculturation
sometimes appears obliquely in constructivist accounts of human rights law. That is,
constructivist scholars, in describing the mechanics of “persuasion,” occasionally slip
into accounts that rely on various aspects of acculturation. Indeed, surveys of
constructivist scholarship often expressly identify persuasion as the central mechanism of
social influence. 19 This failure to differentiate between importantly distinct social
processes leaves several important tasks undone, including: defining the elements that
differentiate persuasion from social sanctions, examining whether social sanctions
exhaust the forms of acculturation, and determining when techniques of persuasion and
acculturation conflict. In the following discussion, we draw from empirical studies that
focus squarely on processes of acculturation to help define the distinctiveness and
significance of each mechanism.
In this Part, we develop in some detail the meaning of each of the three mechanisms,
and briefly describe the research suggesting their presence and general features. We do
not attempt to prove or disprove the empirical validity of the identified causal
mechanisms. In our view, substantial evidence suggests that each of these modes of
social influence occur in global politics and that there are conditions under which each
would be expected to predominate. An open question, in our view, is how this
burgeoning empirical record might be employed to build more effective, more responsive
human rights institutions. We consider each of the mechanisms in turn.

A. Coercion
The first, and most obvious, social mechanism is coercion—states and institutions
influence the behavior of other states by escalating the benefits of conformity or
escalating the costs of non-conformity through material rewards and punishments. Of
course, this mechanism does not necessarily involve any change in the target actor’s
underlying preferences. Consider a simple example: Even if State A would prefer to
continue Practice X, it discontinues the practice to avoid the sanctions threatened by
States B, C, and D. The anatomy of this example also helps illustrate the various moving
parts of the coercion mechanism. Note that the coercive gesture of States B, C, and D
would prove ineffective if the expected benefit of Practice X exceeded the expected cost
18

See, e.g., Drezner, supra note ___, at 11 (identifying three types of interactions: contracting (true
coordination games), coercion, and persuasion); Ian Hurd, Legitimacy and Authority in International
Relations, 53 INT’L ORG. 379 (1999) (same).
19
See, e.g., Payne, supra note __, at 38 (pointing out that “persuasion is considered the centrally important
mechanism” for constructivists); Johnston, supra note ___, at 495 (“The focus on internalization tends to lead
constructivists to focus on persuasion.”).
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of the threatened sanctions. Take a more concrete example. The United States, under the
Foreign Assistance Act, denies foreign assistance to states “engag[ing] in a consistent
pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.”20 Any state
denied assistance on this basis (and any state facing this prospect) is thereby coerced to
alter its behavior. States and institutions, under the logic of this mode of influence,
change the behavior of other states not by reorienting their preferences but rather by
changing the cost/benefit calculations of that state. Also, although international
institutions do not reconfigure state interests and preferences, they might, under certain
conditions, constrain strategic choices by stabilizing mutual expectations about state
behavior.21 Put simply, target states change their behavior because they perceive it to be
in their material interest to do so.
Theories suggesting the predominance of this mechanism build on more general
theories about the character of international politics. Proponents of this school of thought
often contend that the material distribution of power among states essentially determines
state behavior.22 “Normative” and institutional developments thus reflect the interests of
powerful states, 23 and compliance with these norms is largely a function of powerful
states’ willingness to enforce them. 24 On this view, international institutions facilitate
state cooperation and coordination by reducing transaction costs (and overcoming other
collective action problems). This view is typically, though not exclusively, associated
with “rationalist” or rational choice approaches to international relations. However, as
noted above, coercion plays an important role in so-called constructivist models of state
behavior as well.

B. Persuasion
The second mechanism of social influence is persuasion—the active, often strategic,
inculcation of norms (often identifying transnational “norm entrepreneurs” as agents of
change).25 On this view, international law influences state behavior through processes of
20

22 U.S.C. § 2151 (a) (2002).
See, e.g., ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY. COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD
POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984); Jeffrey W Legro, Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the “Failure” of
Internationalism, 51 INT’L ORG. 31 (1997).
22
NEOREALISM AND ITS CRITICS (Robert O. Keohane ed., 1986); Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based
Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823 (2002).
23
STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY (2001); Jack Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner,
A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113 (1999).
24
A.M. Weisburd, Implications of International Relations Theory for the International Law of Human
Rights, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 45 (1999); Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty, Regimes, and Human
Rights, in REGIME THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (V. Rittberger ed, 1993).
25
Thomas Risse, Let's Argue!: Communicative Action in World Politics, 54 INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION 1 (2000); Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political
Change, 52 International Organization 887 (1998); MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK; ACTIVISTS
BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998). For important legal arguments
relying on a persuasion mechanism, see THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
INSTITUTIONS (1998); Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective
Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273 (1997).
21

Socialization and Human Rights

11

social “learning” and other forms of information conveyance.26 Persuasion then “is not
simply a process of manipulating exogenous incentives to elicit behavior from the other
side. Rather it requires argument and deliberation in an effort to change the minds of
others.”27 Persuaded actors “internalize” new norms and rules of appropriate behavior
and redefine their interests and identities accordingly.28 The touchstone of this approach
is that actors are consciously convinced of the truth, validity, or appropriateness of a
norm, belief, or practice.29 That is, persuasion occurs when actors actively assess the
content of a particular message—a norm, practice, or belief—and “change their minds.”30
Next consider how persuasion works—a matter explored in depth in a vast,
interdisciplinary literature. At the risk of oversimplifying this rich and varied body of
work, we highlight two factors that determine, in substantial part, the persuasiveness of
counter-attitudinal messages.31 The first and most important dimension is the technique
of “framing.” The basic idea is that the persuasive appeal of a counter-attitudinal message
increases if the issue is strategically “framed” to “resonate” with already accepted
normative frameworks.32 Many studies of this technique emphasize the role of strategic
“norm entrepreneurs” who manipulate frames to resonate with target audiences.33 One
widely studied, because highly successful, example of such strategic “framing” is the
campaign to ban anti-personnel landmines. The campaign—which culminated in the
Ottawa Convention banning the production and use of the weapons—successfully framed
the issue in terms of the “indiscriminate nature and effects” of landmines thereby linking
the issue with a universally accepted principle of humanitarian law (and other successful
campaigns against weapons of mass destruction). 34

26
See, e.g., MARTHA FINNEMORE, NATIONAL INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 141 (1996) (arguing
that even “normative claims become powerful and prevail by being persuasive”).
27
Alastair Iain Johnston, The Social Effects of International Institutions on Domestic (and Foreign Policy)
Actors, in LOCATING THE PROPER AUTHORITIES, supra note ___, at 145, 153.
28
See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997);
Jeffrey T. Checkel, Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe, 43 INT’L STUD. Q. 83
(1999).
29
This is a long-held view in social psychology. See, e.g., CARL IVER HOVLAND, ET AL., COMMUNICATION
AND PERSUASION (1953) (outlining the steps in the persuasion process including attention, comprehension,
and acceptance of message).
30
See, e.g., Johnston, supra note ___, at 496 (“[Persuasion] involves changing minds, opinions, and
attitudes about causality and affect (identity) in the absence of overtly material or mental coercion.”).
31
See THE PERSUASION HANDBOOK: DEVELOPMENTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (James Price Dillard &
Michael Pfau, eds. 2002) [hereinafter THE PERSUASION HANDBOOK] (surveying literature across disciplines);
PHILIP G. ZIMBARDO & MICHAEL R. LEIPPE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ATTITUDE CHANGE AND SOCIAL INFLUENCE
127-67 (1991) (surveying social psychology literature); Diana Mutz, et al., Political Persuasion: The Birth of
a Field of Study, in POLITICAL PERSUASION AND ATTITUDE CHANGE 1-17 (Diana Mutz, et al., eds. 1996)
(surveying research in political science).
32
See, e.g., KECK & SIKKINK, supra note ___, at 16-18; David A. Snow & Robert D. Benford, Ideology,
Frame Resonance, and participant Mobilization, in FROM STRUCTURE TO ACTION: COMPARING SOCIAL
MOVEMENT RESEARCH ACROSS CULTURES 197 (Bert Klandermans, et al. eds. 1988); David A. Snow, et al.,
Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation, 51 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV.
464 (1986).
33
See, e.g., Koh, supra note ___, at 2612; Ethan Nadelmann, Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution
of Norms in International Society, 44 INT’L ORG. 479, 482 (1990).
34
See Richard Price, Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Landmines, 52 INT’L
ORG. 613, 622-630 (1998).
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A second dimension of persuasion is the technique of “cueing” target audiences to
“think harder” about the merits of a counter-attitudinal message. The idea here is that the
introduction of new information often prompts actors to “engage in a high intensity
process of cognition, reflection, and argument . . . .”35 Substantial empirical evidence
suggests that actors often change their beliefs when, under such conditions, they examine
(and defend) their positions systematically. 36 Given its general features, this microprocess works best in iterated, highly institutionalized social environments wherein new
information is routinely and systematically linked to broadly shared attitudes.37 In this
way, documentation and study of the extent of human rights abuses (and the conditions
under which abuses are likely) cue states to reexamine current practices and positions—
particularly within the framework of global human rights institutions. For example, the
extensive documentation of gross human rights abuses in several Latin American military
governments in the 1970s and 1980s prompted states to reconsider the scope and
character of international human rights regimes—and important changes followed in
many inter-governmental organizations at the regional and international level.38 This
example, however, should not encourage a narrow view of the kind of information likely
to produce these “cueing” effects. Indeed, new information about the preferences of other
states might prompt states to reexamine their views or practices.39 Put differently, the new
information need not concern matters exogenous to the international institution.
We should also note that “cueing” often operates more like “teaching”—depending
on the character of the issue and the predisposition of the relevant actors. That is, actors
and institutions, in some circumstances, might convince target audiences to discard
previously held views by conveying authoritative information discrediting those views. 40
This specie of “cueing” is particularly important in addressing inadvertent or uninformed
non-observance of community standards.41

C. Acculturation
As described briefly in the Introduction, a burgeoning, interdisciplinary literature
suggests another important mechanism of social influence—acculturation. By
acculturation, we mean the general process of adopting the beliefs and behavioral
patterns of the surrounding culture. This mechanism induces behavioral changes through
35

Johnston, supra note ___, at 496.
See ZIMBARDO & LEIPPE, supra note ___, at 192-97 (summarizing important developments in the field).
37
See, e.g., James L. Gibson, A Sober Second Thought: An Experiment in Persuading Russians to
Tolerate, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 819, 826-831 (1998).
38
See KECK & SIKKINK, supra note ___, 89-97 (summarizing these developments).
39
See, e.g., Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52
INT’L ORG. 887, 895-905 (1998) (arguing that norm internalization occurs when the number of states
accepting of the norm reaches a “tipping point” triggering “norm cascades.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral
Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996).
40
See, e.g., FINNEMORE, supra note ___ (discussing example of UNESCO).
41
See, e.g., CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note ___; Jonas Tallberg, Paths to Compliance: Enforcement,
Management, and the European Union, 56 INT’L ORG. 609 (2002).
36
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pressures to assimilate—some imposed by other actors and some imposed by the self. 42
This mechanism encompasses a number of micro-processes including orthodoxy,
identification, and status-maximization.43 In this Section, we first specify some of the
ways in which acculturation occurs. We then clarify the relationship between this
mechanism and the other two previously discussed. And, finally, we analyze (at a
conceptually abstract level for the moment) how institutions might harness acculturation
processes to socialize recalcitrant states.
1. The Micro-processes of Acculturation
The touchstone of this mechanism is that varying degrees of identification with a
group generates varying degrees of cognitive and social pressures—real or imagined—to
conform. These “cognitive pressures” are in an important sense internal and pro-social—
that is, actors in several respects are driven to conform. These internal pressures include:
(1) social-psychological costs of non-conformity (such as dissonance associated with
conduct that is inconsistent with an actor’s identity and social roles);44 and (2) socialpsychological benefits of conforming to group norms and expectations (such as the
“cognitive comfort” associated with both high social status45 and membership in a
perceived “in-group”46). Acculturation is also propelled by “social pressures”— by which
we mean pro-social pressure applied by the group. These pressures—which are no doubt
more familiar to many readers—include: (1) the imposition of social-psychological costs
through shaming or shunning; and (2) the conferral of social-psychological benefits
through “back-patting” and other displays of public approval.47

42
See, e.g., THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS (Walter W. Powell & Paul J.
DiMaggio eds., 1991); W. RICHARD SCOTT & J OHN W. MEYER, INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTS AND
ORGANIZATIONS (1994); John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure
as Myth and Ceremony, 83 AM. J. SOC. 340 (1977); Lynne G. Zucker, Institutional Theories of Organization,
13 ANN. REV. SOC. 443, 443-64 (1987); Lynne G. Zucker, The Role of Institutionalization in Cultural
Persistence, 42 AM. SOC. REV. 726 (1977).
43
See, e.g., Johnston, supra note ___, at 499-502 (summarizing research on this point across several
disciplines); Elvin Hatch, Theories of Social Honor, 91 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 341 (1989) (summarizing
cross-cultural research); ROMANO HARRE, SOCIAL BEING: A THEORY FOR SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (1979)
(providing more extended statement of this research agenda in psychology and sociology).
44
See, e.g., Robert Axelrod, Promoting Norms: An Evolutionary Approach to Norms, in THE COMPLEXITY
OF COOPERATION 44 (Robert Axelrod, ed. 1997); JOHN C. TURNER, REDISCOVERING THE SOCIAL GROUP
(1987); Christopher Barnum, A Reformulated Social Identity Theory, 14 ADVANCES IN GROUP PROCESSES 29
(1997).
45
See, e.g., ROBERT FRANK, CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND: HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND THE QUEST FOR STATUS
31-33 (1985) (arguing that high status is a good itself—generating a range of psychological benefits); see
also ROBERT FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE EMOTIONS (1988).
46
See, e.g., ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE : THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY OF MODERN PERSUASION (1984).
47
See, e.g., CIALDINI, supra note ___; Petty, at al., supra note ___, at 612-20. These micro-processes are
well-represented in the international law literature—though they are typically embedded in a coercion model
of social influence. See, e.g., Thomas Risse, et al., The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms
into Domestic Practices: Introduction, in THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND
DOMESTIC CHANGE 11-35 (Thomas Risse, et al., eds. 1998) (outlining a “spiral model” of socialization
incorporating elements of coercion, persuasion, and shaming).
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2. Acculturation as Incomplete Internalization: Distinguishing Persuasion
Despite the obvious similarities, this mechanism differs from persuasion in important
respects. First, persuasion requires acceptance of the validity or legitimacy of a belief or
norm—acculturation requires only that an actor perceive that an important reference
group harbors the belief, engages in the practice, or subscribes to the norm. Second,
persuasion requires active assessment of the merits of a belief.48 Acculturation processes
often operate tacitly; it is often the very act of conforming that garners social approval
and alleviates cognitive discomfort (see Table I). Persuasion involves assessment of the
content of the message (even if only indirectly); acculturation involves assessment of the
social relation (the degree of identification) between the target audience and some group.
Because the acculturation process does not involve being persuaded of the merits of a
group’s position, it may result in outward conformity with a social convention without
private acceptance or corresponding changes in private practices.
These differences have important practical ramifications. The empirical research in
psychology, sociology, and political science strongly suggests the importance of
processes of acculturation in shaping state identity, preferences, interests, and behavior.49
Some of these studies emphasize the significance of group identification and cognitive
frames in influencing state action.50 The studies also predict spurious forms of
48

It is also important to note that we include in our conception of acculturation, a micro-process identified
in the persuasion literature. One well-documented finding of this literature is that the relationship between the
persuader and the target audience may foster (or impede) “persuasion.” That is, the “persuasiveness” of a
message—controlling for its content—varies according to the relationship between the persuader and
persuadee. Although this factor is not central in human rights literature, it is important to mention this
dimension of acculturation because of its significance for institutional design in general. Again, the
scholarship studying various manifestations of this dynamic is vast, but for our purposes we highlight one
important point: Substantial evidence suggests that high affect relationships foster “persuasion.” See
PERSUASION HANDBOOK, supra note __, at 289-328 (summarizing recent developments in this research). The
idea here is simple. If the persuadee trusts, “likes,” respects, or identifies with the persuader, the
persuasiveness of claims advanced by the persuader increases. See, e.g., Richard E. Petty et al., Attitudes and
Attitude Change, 48 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 609, 612-629 (1997); James H. Kuklinski & Norman L. Hurley, It’s a
Matter of Interpretation, in POLITICAL PERSUASION AND POLITICAL CHANGE, supra note ___, at 129-131. In
the international relations literature specifically, see Risse, supra note ___ (arguing that “trust in the
authenticity of the speaker is a precondition for the persuasiveness of a moral argument.”). Moreover, a
related finding of these studies is that such affect relations are fostered in iterated, highly institutionalized
environments. Id. Examples of this micro-process abound. Consider Steven Ratner’s study of the High
Commissioner on National Minorities of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe; Ratner
demonstrates how such “normative intermediaries,” if perceived as impartial and legitimate, persuade states
(and other parties to ethnic conflicts) to de-escalate tensions and embrace rule of law values in their dealings
with each other. See Steven R. Ratner, Does International Law Matter in Preventing Ethnic Conflict?, 32
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 591, 678-683 (2000). In this example, the perceived impartiality and legitimacy of
the persuader imbued him with normative authority and instilled trust in the target audience. Id. at 681-82.
Because, in this scenario, the persuadee does not actively assess the content of the message, we classify this
affect-driven “persuasion” as “acculturation.”
49
See generally Goodman & Jinks, Toward an Institutional Theory of Sovereignty (summarizing this
empirical work).
50
See, e.g., SCIENCE IN THE MODERN WORLD POLITY: INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND GLOBALIZATION (Gili S.
Drori ed. 2003); John W. Meyer, John Boli, George M. Thomas & Francisco O. Ramirez, World Society and
the Nation-State, 103 AM. J. SOC. 144 (1997); John Boli, World Polity Sources of Expanding State Authority
and Organizations, 1870-1970, in INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE : CONSTITUTING STATE, SOCIETY, AND THE
INDIVIDUAL (George Thomas et al. eds., 1987).
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compliance and peculiar patterns of norm diffusion associated with acculturation. And,
all these features naturally have considerable implications for regime design.
These insights are obviously “constructivist” in that they emphasize the role of social
interaction in preference and identity formation. As such, the acculturation mechanism
shares many conceptual commitments with the persuasion mechanism. Indeed, it is fair to
say that acculturation is, in many respects, part of the broader process of persuasion. That
is, acculturation might serve as the cultural predicate for all acts of persuasion. Whether
this claim is accurate or not, the analytical distinction between the two mechanisms is
coherent and meaningful. Moreover, because complete “internalization” is elusive in
international affairs—particularly on many contentious human rights issues—
international legal studies should fashion a framework for analyzing lower levels of
socialization. We maintain that social forces influence actors in many ways other than
“internalization;” and that law and legal institutions might harness these social forces to
promote rule of law values.
3. Acculturation as Social Sanctions and Rewards: Distinguishing Coercion
The conceptual distinction between acculturation and coercion also requires some
clarification. Although the distinction is clear at a high level of abstraction, the way in
which we define acculturation potentially blurs the distinction between the two at a lower
level of abstraction. Recall that, on our view, acculturation processes include social
sanctions and rewards, such as shaming, back-patting, and other means of identification
and belonging. Many readers will justifiably think that this definition of acculturation
eviscerates the distinction between coercion and acculturation (and that, as a
consequence, social sanctions and rewards should be part of the “coercion” category).
A few points make clear the conceptual integrity of acculturation in our model. The
distinction, on the conceptual level, is straightforward. Coercion encompasses social
sanctions that influence actors because those target actors conclude that “social costs”
will translate into material costs. Acculturation, on the other hand, includes these
“coercive” elements only to the extent that social costs, in and of themselves, influence
thought and action. That is, this dimension of acculturation captures those circumstances
in which actors conform to social pressure not because of some second-order calculation
of the costs and benefits of cooperation but rather because “conforming” and “belonging”
themselves confer substantial affective returns (“cognitive comfort”).51 Simple coercion
models cannot adequately account for these effects; and we demonstrate the difference
this distinction makes in our analysis of concrete regime design problems below.
Moreover, there are good reasons to analyze pure “social costs” differently. Consider first
that these costs are virtually incalculable—and indeed an avalanche of social science
evidence suggests that actors do not attempt, even in a casual way, to calculate them.
Substantial evidence, for example, suggests that actors systematically fail to forecast
accurately their future affective states (and the impact that certain practices will have on

51

See, e.g., TIM WILSON, STRANGERS TO OURSELVES (2003).
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those states).52 The expected influence and effects of material rewards are, on the other
hand, more amenable to conventional cost-benefit modeling.

4. Acculturation and the State
Although substantial evidence demonstrates that acculturation processes occur and
more precisely how they take place, there is good reason to question whether states as
such are amenable to “acculturation.” After all, much of the research suggesting the
presence of this mechanism centers on the cognitive processes of individuals. Do states
“identify” with a reference group in any meaningful sense? Are states motivated by
cognitive frameworks and social pressures? Substantial evidence strongly suggests, on
both counts, that they do. As we summarized in an earlier article, there is a burgeoning
empirical (and theoretical) literature—so-called “world polity institutionalism”—
documenting cultural and associational aspects of international politics that suggest the
influence of acculturation. 53 This scholarship has direct roots in the sociology of
organizations and, more specifically, in empirical studies that demonstrate how the goals
and composition of formal organizations (e.g., universities, public hospitals) derive in
considerable part from their wider social environment.54 A methodologically simple, yet
enormously useful, move is to study the state as a formal organization—taking the
sociology of organizations global.
In organizational sociology, theories of acculturation predict that socialization
processes will press organizations toward increasing “isomorphism”—that is, structural
similarity across organizations.55 These theoretical models also predict that increasing
homogenization will not reflect the functional task demands of the organization.56 Rather
than correlating with local task demands, structural attributes and goals of the
organization will correlate with attributes and goals of other organizations at the time.
When institutional conditions are favorable for acculturation, the evidence suggests that
the previously identified cognitive and social pressures will encourage pro-social
behavior. Isolating these institutional conditions is more difficult. As suggested by the
micro-processes of acculturation, however, one can delineate two requirements for the
effective functioning of this mechanism: (1) embedding target actors in an
institutionalized social setting and (2) institutionalizing at the group level preferred forms
of identity.57 The question is whether states, like other organizational forms, respond to
and are in significant part reflections of their wider institutional environment.
Numerous empirical studies now suggest that states are significantly shaped and
legitimated through their broader organizational environment.58 That is, states constitute
52
See, e.g., Daniel Gilbert & Tim Wilson, Affective Forecasting, in ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOLOGY 345-411 (2003).
53
See Goodman & Jinks, Toward an Institutional Theory of Sovereignty, supra note __, at 1757-1765.
54
W. RICHARD SCOTT, INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS (1995).
55
Zucker, supra note __, at 443 & 452 (surveying the literature).
56
See generally THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note ___ (explaining
the empirical predications of various institutional approaches); see also Zucker, supra note __, at 443.
57
Zucker, supra note __, at 453.
58
Our approach is “constructivist” in that we emphasize the importance of social interaction. That is, we
advance the view that state structure, identity and preferences are constructed by social forces. Nevertheless,
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highly legitimated actors in world society and their formal structures (e.g., administrative
bodies, policy commitments) are substantially derived from institutionalized models
promulgated at the global level. These studies generally proceed by collecting
quantitative data for all available states over several decades and use analytic
techniques—including event history analysis, regression analysis, and process tracing—
to test predictions of acculturation. The studies demonstrate that states emulate
standardized models of structural organization in areas such as environmental policy, 59
educational curricula,60 militarization,61 the laws of war,62 and human rights.63 As many
commentators have pointed out, the extent of isomorphism across states is remarkable,
and seemingly inexplicable without reference to acculturation processes.64 Importantly,
the studies do not suggest that this structural convergence reflects actual practices or
effects on the ground. On the contrary, the convergence (across states) is accompanied by
substantial and persistent decoupling (within states): official purposes and formal
structure are disconnected from functional demands and results. Rather than correlating

our approach contrasts with conventional constructivist models in two respects: (1) we emphasize top-down
processes; and (2) we identify acculturation as the causal mechanism that drives the emergence and diffusion
of global scripts (rather than “habitualization” and “persuasion”). We should emphasize at the outset that our
approach avoids two common pitfalls in constructivist research. First, our approach is falsifiable in that it
generates a range of concrete empirical predictions that allow for the adjudication between our approach and
competing explanations. Second, our approach avoids the circularity problem endemic to some constructivist
research. Indeed, constructivist research often fails to distinguish adequately between explanatory and
outcome variables. The “new institutionalism” we embrace distinguishes between “organizations” and
“institutions”—the concept of “organization” refers to the formal apparatus (and its purposes) whereas the
concept of “institution” refers to all regulative and cognitive features of the organizational environment such
as rules or shared beliefs. Of course, many “institutions” can also be understood as “organizations”
depending on the object of the study. For example, in a study of the organizational features of hospitals, the
state (including perhaps most prominently, regulatory agencies) are part of the institutional environment
within which hospitals operate. But, in a study of the organizational features of state regulatory agencies, it is
the agencies themselves that are analyzed as “organizations” (and “institutions” in this study would include
the salient features of the wider cultural environment in which the agencies are embedded). The important
point is that our approach avoids circularity problems by clearly differentiating, as an analytic matter,
explanatory (institutions) and outcome variables (organizations). See generally SCOTT, supra note ___ ;
Goodman & Jinks, supra note ___ .
59
David John Frank, Ann Hironaka & Evan Schofer, Environmentalism as a Global Institution, 65 AM.
SOC. REV. 122 (2000); David John Frank, Ann Hironaka & Evan Schofer, The Nation-State and the Natural
Environment over the Twentieth Century, 65 AM. SOC. REV. 96 (2000).
60
JOHN W. MEYER, DAVID KAMENS & AARON BENAVOT, SCHOOL KNOWLEDGE FOR THE MASSES: WORLD
MODELS AND NATIONAL PRIMARY CURRICULAR CATEGORIES IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1992); John W.
Meyer, Francisco O. Ramirez & Yasemin Soysal, World Expansion of Mass Education, 1870-1980, 65 SOC.
EDUC. 128 (1992).
61
See, e.g., Dana P. Eyre & Mark C. Suchman, Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of Conventional
Weapons: An Institutional Theory Approach, in THE CULTURE OF NATIONAL SECURITY: NORMS AND
IDENTITY IN WORLD POLITICS 79 (Peter J. Katzenstein ed., 1996).
62
See, e.g., Martha Finnemore, Rules of War and Wars of Rules: The International Red Cross and the
Restraint of State Violence, in CONSTRUCTING WORLD CULTURE, supra note _, at 149.
63
See infra notes __-__.
64
See, e.g., CONSTRUCTING WORLD CULTURE (John Boli & George Thomas eds., 1999); David John Frank,
Suk-Ying Wong, John W Meyer & Francisco O. Ramirez, What Counts as History: A Cross-National and
Longitudinal Study of University Curricula, 44 COMP. EDUC. REV. 29 (2000); John W. Meyer, John Boli,
George M. Thomas & Francisco O. Ramirez, World Society and the Nation-State, 103 AM. J. SOC. 144
(1997). Indeed, “institutionalists would expect roughly contemporaneous global change, regardless of
objective technological conditions.” Finnemore, supra note __.
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with local task demands, structural attributes and official goals of the state correlate in
important ways with attributes and goals of other states in the world.
With respect to human rights, extensive research identifies these patterns of norm
diffusion in fundamental areas of governance including welfare and labor policy,65 civil
rights guarantees,66 and public order strategies.67 For example, the number of
constitutions that include provisions committed to the state management of childhood and
the right to education has increased dramatically.68 A study of every national constitution
in 1870-1970 shows that the adoption of such provisions in constitutions over time does
not correlate with local forms of social organization (such as urbanization and national
wealth) or with technical capacities of the state.69 Moreover, each group of newly
established states shows a significantly higher probability of adopting such constitutional
provisions than the preceding group of entrants.70 The overall findings suggest that
“[n]ational constitutions do not simply reflect processes of internal development. They
reflect legitimating ideas dominant in the world system at the time of their creation.”71
Also consider state convergence with respect to women’s rights. One of the leading
studies uses sophisticated analytic techniques (event history analysis) to examine state
definitions of political citizenship over a hundred-year period.72 According to the study,
once universal suffrage became a legitimating principle associated with the modern
nation-state, state enactment of women’s suffrage followed a pattern anticipated by
theories of acculturation. After an initial stage of early adopters, the number of states
providing women the right to vote increased steeply and included most states before
tapering off; rates of adoption tracked world trend lines; and adoption correlated far less
with domestic political conditions once isomorphism took hold.73 An especially important
finding clearly indicates a “contagion effect”: once the norm is institutionalized, a strong
predictor for whether an individual state will enact women’s suffrage is whether other
states in its region have done so in the past five years.74 The overall findings suggest that,
65
Andrew Abbott & Stanley DeViney, The Welfare State as Transnational Event: Evidence from
Sequences of Policy Adoption, 16 SOC. SCI. HIST. 245 (1992); David Strang & Patricia Mei Yin Chang, The
International Labour Organization and the Welfare State: Institutional Effects on National Welfare
Spending, 1960-80, 47 INT’L ORG. 235 (1993); George M. Thomas & Pat Lauderdale, State Authority and
National Welfare Programs in the World System Context, 3 SOC. FORUM 383 (1988).
66
John Boli, World Polity Sources of Expanding State Authority and Organizations, 1870-1970, in
INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE : CONSTITUTING STATE, SOCIETY, AND THE INDIVIDUAL (George M. Thomas, John
W. Meyer, Francisco Ramirez & John Boli eds., 1987); see also David John Frank & Elizabeth McEneaney,
The Individualization of Society and the Liberalization of State Policies on Same Sex Sexual Relations, 77
SOC. FORCES 911 (1999).
67
CONNIE MCNEELY, CONSTRUCTING THE NATION-STATE : INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND
PRESCRIPTIVE ACTION (1995); Meyer et al., supra note 39, at 158.
68
John Boli-Bennett & John W. Meyer, The Ideology of Childhood and the State: Rules Distinguishing
Children in National Constitutions, 1870-1970, 43 AM. SOC. REV. 797 (1978).
69
Boli-Bennett & John W. Meyer, supra note __, at 809.
70
Id. at 805.
71
Id. at 805.
72
Francisco Ramirez, Yasemin Soysal & Susanne Shanahan, The Changing Logic of Political Citizenship:
Cross-national Acquisition of Women's Suffrage Rights, 1890 to 1990, 62 AM. SOC. REV. 735, 739 (1997)
(using events history analysis).
73
Id. at __.
74
Id. at 740 & 741.
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compared with local conditions (such as the strength of domestic women’s rights groups),
“countries apparently are affected much less strongly by internal factors and much more
strongly by shifts in the international logic of political citizenship.”75
These results coincide with other areas of women’s rights. For example, a separate
study of states in the western hemisphere examines how these governments made roughly
contemporaneous commitments to eradicate violence against women.76 Within a
relatively short time span, “nearly all American states have created national women’s
councils that include domestic violence problems among their priorities, have approved
legal changes that define domestic violence as a crime, have launched educational
campaigns to combat the problem, and have created social services for victims.”77 They
have also done so without any one state far exceeding, or distinguishing itself from, the
average set of commitments. 78 The extent of isomorphism notwithstanding wide
variations in national political, cultural, and social conditions is remarkable. Specifically,
once domestic violence was institutionalized at the regional-level as an obligation for
governments to address, states joined the bandwagon in adopting such measures despite
dramatic differences in women’s political power or access to economic resources at the
national level. 79 Indeed, the authors conclude that at this stage of institutionalization,
“international socialization is more important than domestic politics” in getting
“nonconformist states to change their policies to meet the standards of new international
norms.”80
In general, the adoption of structural commitments or official policy goals in human
rights does not necessarily entail concrete implementation. On the contrary, when states
copy a global model that does not fit their local needs we should expect a continued
disjuncture between structural isomorphism (across states) and technical demands and
results (within states). For example, the authors of the study of state management of
childhood “did not argue that constitutional rules in particular countries are likely to be
‘implemented,’ but rather that prevailing world ideologies are likely to be incorporated
both ideologically and organizationally.”81 The fact that local social and economic
drivers do not explain when states adopt the observed constitutional provisions, and the
fact that adoption of such constitutional guarantees does not correlate with technical
capacities to implement the provisions, suggests decoupling might persist. The study of
domestic violence also finds that many of the official commitments remain “woefully
underfunded”82 and subsequent implementation of these programs “is still unclear.”83
75

Id. at 742.
Darren G. Hawkins & Melissa Humes, Human Rights and Domestic Violence: Norm Diffusion in the
Americas, 117 Political Science Quarterly 231, 235 (2002).
77
Id. at 234; see also id. at (finding that the “share important similarities in the ways in which they identify
national goals, institutionalize guidelines and procedures … and outline programs to prevent abuse and treat
victims”).
78
Id. at 234 (“[I]t is difficult to argue that any state’s policy is more far-reaching or successful than that of
any other state.”); see also id. (discussing other comparative studies).
79
Id. at
80
Id. at 256.
81
Cf. Boli-Bennett & John W. Meyer, supra note __, at 809; see also John Boli-Bennett & John W. Meyer,
Constitutions as Ideology, 45 AM. SOC. REV. 525, 526 (1980).
82
Id. at 236.
83
Id. at 257.
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Indeed, as explained above with respect to the sociology of organizations in general, the
theory of acculturation predicts cross-national isomorphism irrespective of local
circumstances. Because these models have developed universal authority and legitimacy,
states follow the global scripts as members of world society despite the ineffectiveness
(or even dysfunctionality) of resultant organizational forms.
We maintain that the evidence of structural isomorphism and decoupling discredit
theories that explain state behavior solely in terms of global power politics. To clarify
why this is so, we consider an important alternate explanation. Critics might accept that
the empirical evidence indicates an external source for state organizational formation, yet
that external source could be powerful actors compelling states through material penalties
or rewards to adopt particular practices. This account, however, is unpersuasive. First,
one would naturally assume that poorer countries are more susceptible to such external
coercion. However, the empirical studies discussed above show that norm adoption does
not correlate with the economic wealth or development of country. Second, this
competing explanation would predict that mimicry (and, hence, isomorphism) would vary
depending on the presence, power, and influence of relevant audiences. Substantial
evidence, however, shows that isomorphism will frequently occur regardless of whether
there is external political pressure to conform. For example, governments follow global
scripts concerning the proper orientation of state policy toward children—even though
powerful states do not have a strong interest in monitoring or forcing others to adopt such
an ideology.84 Third, powerful states are often late adopters in some issue areas,
including human rights law.85 Fourth, counter-hegemonic norms exhibit the same pattern
of diffusion as pro-hegemonic norms—suggesting that conventional conceptions of
global power politics provide an inadequate descriptive account. One important example
is the norm of self-determination (understood as a fundamental human right), which
supported decolonization and motivated many indigenous rights campaigns. 86 And,
finally, the coercion explanation cannot account for persistent “decoupling”—that is,
there is no theory to explain why formal policy convergence without effective
implementation on the ground would appease powerful states.87

84
See, e.g., John Boli-Bennett & John W. Meyer, The Ideology of Childhood and the State 1870-1970, 43
AM. SOC. REV. 797 (1978).
85
See, e.g., Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note ___ (describing global diffusion of women’s suffrage and
highlighting that global hegemons were late adopters); Ramirez, supra note __, at 735.
86
See David Strang, Global Patterns of Decolonization 1500-1987, 35 INT’L STUD. Q. 429 (1991); David
Strang, From Dependency to Sovereignty: An Event History Analysis of Decolonization 1870-1987, 55 AM.
SOC. REV. 846 (1990).
87
Another approach might emphasize the rationality of mimicry as a signal to domestic and international
audiences—irrespective of the whether the global script produces results on the ground. See, e.g., Goldsmith
& Posner, Moral and Legal Rhetoric, supra note __. Although the predictions of this approach track our own
in many respects, two points of disagreement bear mentioning. First, this approach does not adequately
account for isomorphism and decoupling. That is, the point about decoupling and learning in the text applies
to this approach as well—although in a slightly modified form: Assuming that states learn, the credibility of
the mimicry signal would substantially degrade over time in an environment characterized by decoupling.
Second, this approach would predict that mimicry (and, hence, isomorphism) would vary depending on the
presence, power, and influence of relevant audiences. Our approach, on the other hand, predicts isomorphism
irrespective of whether there is political pressure to conform. See generally Goodman & Jinks, supra note
___.
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One remaining question is whether the conditions favorable to acculturation are
amenable to manipulation in order to promote behavioral change through institutions.
Drawing on institutional theories of the state, we maintain that they are. First, significant
empirical evidence shows that increased institutionalization of a model at the global level
is followed by its adoption, or diffusion, across states.88 Second, the empirical research
also shows that integration of a state in world society is a strong predictor of whether that
the state will adopt global cultural scripts.89 Accordingly, this body of scholarship offers
unique insights for designing international regimes to regulate state behavior. We submit
that the basic elements necessary for acculturation could be fostered by embedding target
actors in social settings organized around highly institutionalized, broadly shared
principles.90 Under these conditions, we maintain that states will likely value their status
in the group (“identify” with, or mimic, the group if you will)—exploiting the cognitive
and social pressures described above. 91 In short, the conditions for acculturation exist at
the international level and can be studied by examining the state as the primary unit of
analysis.
This evidence demonstrates, at a high level of generality, that states respond to
cultural forces. Less clear is how exactly this occurs. That is, the evidence described
above does not document a specific causal pathway by which culture influences state
action. And although we consider this issue an important one—one that requires rigorous
empirical testing—the claims made in this Article do not rely upon any particular theories
about how acculturation occurs. In other words, our claims are not predicated on a tacit
theory of domestic political economy. Indeed, the empirical record to date is consistent
with a number of possible causal routes including the following: government
representatives or high-level policy makers might be directly acculturated in the social
environments of international institutions;92 members of special interest groups might be
acculturated and they, in turn, persuade domestic audiences (or political leaders) to adopt
pro-social practices;93 or perhaps, in some cases, relevant domestic audiences are directly
acculturated by broader social forces and these audiences, in turn, coerce (or persuade)
their political leaders to adopt pro-social behavior.94 We are, for the purposes of this
Article, agnostic about which of these theories best accounts for the observed behavior of
states. Irrespective of the specific causal pathway, we maintain that observed state
behavior is, in some non-trivial sense, the product of acculturation. The following Parts
also illustrate that fundamental issues of institutional design turn on processes at this
level of abstraction.
88

Frank et al., The Nation-State, supra note 49, at 97-101.
See, e.g., Meyer at al, supra note __; John Frank, Ann Hironaka & Evan Schofer, The Nation-State and
the Natural Environment over the Twentieth Century, 65 AM. SOC. REV. 96, 106 (2000); John W. Meyer,
Francisco O. Ramirez & Yasemin Soysal, World Expansion of Mass Education, 1870-1980, 65 SOC. EDUC.
146 (1992).
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This is a necessary predicate of acculturation in any meaningful sense. See, e.g., Johnston, supra note
___, at 501 (pointing out that effectiveness of acculturation processes “hinges . . . on an intersubjectively
agreed upon notion of what socially valuable behavior looks like”).
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See, e.g., LOWELL DITTMER & SAMUEL S. KIM, CHINA’S QUEST FOR NATIONAL IDENTITY 14-15 (1993)
(arguing that shaming effects turn on the perceived legitimacy of the actor or group engaged in social
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See, e.g., Johnston, supra note ___ .
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See, e.g., Risse, et al., supra note ___.
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Table I. Three Mechanisms of Social Influence on States
Coercion

Basis of Influence

Interest

Persuasion

Congruence with Values

Acculturation

Social Expectations
Cultural Identity

Behavioral Logic

Instrumentalism

Active Assessment of
Validity of Rule

Social Role
Social Status
Mimicry

Forms of Influence

Material Rewards
and Punishment

Convincing
Teaching

Social Rewards and
Punishment
(shaming, shunning,
back-patting)

Cueing to Think Harder
Cognitive Costs and
Benefits
(orthodoxy, dissonance)

Result

Compliance

Acceptance

Conformity

In the balance of the Article, we analyze three regime design problems in human
rights law: (1) conditional membership in organizations; (2) precision of obligations; and
(3) monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. Two primary points follow from this
analysis. First, regime design principles for each issue vary substantially across the
identified behavioral logics. In short, mechanisms matter for regime design. Second, the
previously under-theorized acculturation mechanism yields many regime design
recommendations that defy conventional wisdom in international law. For example, the
de-institutionalizing effects of many traditional “hard law” devices would, we claim,
diminish the compliance-inducing effects of acculturation. We also provide three
tables—one for each regime design problem— summarizing our analysis.
II. CONDITIONAL MEMBERSHIP
An important choice in designing human rights regimes involves deciding between
an inclusive or restrictive rule on membership in multilateral organizations.95 More
95

Koremenos, et al., The Rational Design of International Institutions, 55 INT’L ORG. 761, 770 (2001)
(“Who belongs to the institution? Is membership exclusive and restrictive, like the G-7’s limitation to rich
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specifically, an ongoing debate—among governmental actors, practitioners, and
scholars—is whether to condition membership on compliance with particular human
rights standards. An inclusive approach would essentially allow all comers to join the
organization and place negligible conditions on maintaining membership status. In
contrast, a restrictive approach would reject candidate states or expel member states that
do not meet particular human rights standards. For example, two supranational
organizations—the United Nations96 and the Council of Europe97—have formally
adopted a restrictive rule. The goals and activities of these organizations include issues
other than human rights. Their membership rules, however, have inspired recent
proposals for human rights regimes. It is that debate—whether to condition membership
in exclusively human rights regimes on human rights performance—which we consider
in depth.
The two principal global human rights forums—international human rights treaties 98
and the U.N. Commission on Human Rights99—are currently modeled on an inclusive
approach. Both institutions formally allow the equal participation of liberal and illiberal
states. However, commentators have suggested that these institutions should condition
their membership on human rights performance. Specifically, scholars have recently
suggested that the major international human rights treaties should limit admission to
states that already comply with particular human rights standards and expel members that
do not comply with terms of the treaty.100 These proposals have spurred an animated
countries? Or is it inclusive by design, like the UN? Membership has been one of the most hotly contested
issues in recent years.”).
96
The U.N. Charter formally allows the organization to function in a restrictive manner, but these powers
have remained largely dormant in practice. Specific articles provide for the exclusion of applicant states, I
Charter of the United Nations, art. 4; cf. Covenant of the League of Nations, art. 1(2), suspension of
membership privileges, see Charter of the United Nations, art. 5, and complete expulsion from the
organization, see Charter of the United Nations, art. 6; cf. Covenant of the League of Nations, art. 16(4).
97
In 1993, the Council adopted a Resolution essentially limiting the provision of observer status to
democratic states. See Statutory Resolution (93) 26 on Observer Status, Committee of Ministers, 92nd
Session (May 14, 1993). In 1994, the Council required applicant states to abolish the death penalty as a
precondition for full membership in the Council. In 2001, the Council’s Parliamentary Assembly adopted a
resolution “call[ing] into question the continuing Observer status of Japan and the United States with the
Organisation as a whole, should no significant progress” occur toward abolition of the death penalty. See
Resolution 1253 (2001) on Abolition of the death penalty in Council of Europe Observer states, 17th Sitting
(June 25, 2001).
98
The six major international human rights treaties are the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 331; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195; the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, art. 10, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, 18
(entered into force Sept. 3, 1981); the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, at 20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S.
85, 114 (entered into force June 26, 1987; the Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature
Nov. 20, 1989, arts. 34, 35, 1577 U.N.T.S. 44, 55 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990).
99
The Commission on Human Rights is a sub-organ of the U.N. General Assembly. Its mandate includes
developing standards for the elaboration and codification of international human rights law and monitoring
and reporting the human rights practices of U.N. member states.
100
See, e.g., Hathaway, supra note __, at 2024 (“Countries might, for example, be required to demonstrate
compliance with certain human rights standards before being allowed to join a human rights treaty. … Or
treaties could include provisions for removing countries that are habitually found in violation of the terms of
the treaty from membership in the treaty regime”); see also Anne F. Bayefsky, Reform of the UN Human
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discussion within the academy. 101 They have also begun to gain political momentum
within other forums, in particular the Commission on Human Rights. A wide rage of
actors—including government representatives,102 policy analysts,103 activists,104 and the
Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights105—have recently supported
the idea of excluding states with poor human rights records from membership in the
Commission on Human Rights.
Importantly, formal membership rules do not exhaust the range of choices
confronting regime architects on this issue. States could, as several historical examples
illustrate, deploy other strategies when existing organizational rules do not explicitly
permit exclusion. As Louis Sohn explained in a leading article on expulsion from
multilateral organizations, “[a]ll these measures can be taken by international
organizations, whether or not their own constitutions expressly provide for them. In fact,
only on a few occasions were the measures taken those actually authorized by explicit
constitutional provisions.”106 Indeed, states have deployed a range of tactics to limit the
participation of governments with offensive human rights practices including: denying
access to regional and preparatory meetings,107 rejecting credentials required for
participation,108 limiting voting or speaking rights,109 and adopting extraordinary

Rights Treaty System, available at <http://66.36.242.93/tree.php/area/reform> (last visited September 6,
2003). These restrictive approaches resemble proposals for excluding illiberal states from transnational legal
regimes. See Anne-Marie Burley [Slaughter], Law Among Liberal States: Liberal Internationalism and the
Act of State Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1907 (1992).
101
See, e.g., Philip Alston, Beyond “Them” and “Us”: Putting Treaty Body Reform into Perspective, in
THE FUTURE OF U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY MONITORING 501 (Philip Alston & James Crawford eds.,
2000); Philip Alston, Final Report on Enhancing the Long-Term Effectiveness of the United Nations Human
Rights Treaty System, U.N. ESCOR, 53d Sess., Agenda Item 15, P 37, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/74 (1996);
Goodman & Jinks, Measuring the Effects of Human Rights Treaties, supra note __, at 171; Hathaway, supra
note __.
102
Ambassador Kevin Moley, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations in Geneva, Jan. 20,
2003 <www.useu.be/Categories/GlobalAffairs/Jan2003UNUSLibyaHumanRights.html> (last visited July 21,
2003) (“The United States will continue to make its position clear. … We are convinced that the best way for
the Commission to ensure the ideals of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights over the long term is to
have a membership comprised of countries with strong human rights records at home.”).
103
Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, U.S. Human Rights Panel Needs Some Entry Standards, INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE,
May 14, 2003.
104
See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, United Nations: Rights Commission Shields Abusers, (Press Release
April 26, 2002) (“[A]ny government whose records the Commission has condemned, who have failed to
implement the Commission's resolutions, or who have refused to allow visits by the Commission's
investigators and experts, should be excluded from membership on the commission.”) available at
<http://hrw.org/press/2002/04/unhchrfinal.htm> (last visited July 21, 2003).
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Richard Waddington, Libya Elected to Chair U.N. Human Rights Body, REUTERS, Jan. 20, 2003 (“U.N.
High Commissioner for Human Rights Sergio Vieira de Mello has backed activists' calls for conditions to be
agreed for Commission membership. These could include signing and ratifying all human rights treaties and
inviting U.N. special rights investigators to visit.”).
106
Louis B. Sohn, Expulsion or Forced Withdrawal from an International Organization, 77 HARV. L. REV.
1381, 1421 (1964).
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See, e.g., Chayes & Chayes, supra note __, at 72 (discussing measures involving Food and Agriculture
Organization, International Telecommunications Union, and South Africa).
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Chayes & Chayes, supra note __, at __; see Sohn, supra note __ at 1401-04 (discussing exclusion of
Spain from several U.N. specialized agencies).
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Chayes & Chayes, supra note __, at 72 (World Health Organization and South Africa).

Socialization and Human Rights

25

resolutions tantamount to expulsion (e.g., “advising” a member state to withdraw).110
These measures often serve as the functional equivalent of formal conditions on
membership. Although we discuss only formal membership rules, our analysis applies to
these informal measures as well. 111
Before proceeding to that analysis, it is also important to note that other design
features may raise some, though not all, of the same considerations. First, procedural or
substantive terms of a treaty may produce significant exclusionary effects. It is well
understood that higher standards in a human rights treaty tend to reduce levels of state
participation. For instance, in drafting the Rome Statute for the International Criminal
Court negotiators ultimately adopted strong procedural and substantive provisions that
effectively forfeited the participation of particular governments. As others have shown, 112
these design choices may also be understood as membership rules.
Second, administrative rules applied in the course of managing a human rights
regime may also implicate the scope of membership. Consider, for example, the
controversy over the appropriate remedy for invalid treaty reservations.113 Proposals
include: severing the reservation and thus keeping the state bound to the treaty; or
nullifying the entire act of ratification.114 Although this debate is complex, the effect each
proposal has on treaty membership must weigh heavily in any systematic evaluation of
these proposals.115 Indeed, the invalidity rule itself was originally justified as the best way
to promote universal membership without sacrificing the integrity of humanitarian treaty
norms.116 Another administrative question concerns the criteria used for accreditation of
governmental delegations in international forums—for example, whether to seat a
democratically elected government-in-exile or the non-democratic government with
110

See, e.g., Sohn, supra note __ at 1409-12 (discussing Economic and Social Council and Portugal);
Chayes & Chayes, supra note __, at 80-81 (discussing Organization of African States and Cuba); id. at 71
(discussing International Labor Organization and South Africa).
111
Aspects of our discussion also apply to strategies that individual governments and non-governmental
organizations might take to encourage illiberal states to join human rights regimes. For example,
understanding the institutionalizing effects of universal membership should influence the emphasis or priority
such actors give to pressuring illiberal states to ratify human rights treaties. Such an understanding should
similarly inform the decision whether to pressure illiberal states to leave international organizations (e.g.,
African states’ boycotting intergovernmental organizations that allowed South African participation).
112
Downs, et al., supra note __, at 500 (analyzing stronger obligations as effectively a restrictive
membership approach in environment, trade, and arms control agreements); Abbott & Snidal, supra note __,
at 429 (describing use of hard law as functionally “an ex ante sorting device”).
113
A reservation is a formal condition made by a state when ratifying a treaty, whereby the state purports
to exclude or modify its obligations under the treaty. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened
for signature May 23, 1969, Art. 2, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. For a range of opinions on the subject of severing
invalid reservations, see Ryan Goodman, Human Rights Treaties, Invalid Reservations, and State Consent, 96
AM. J. INT’L L. 531 (2002); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and
Conditional Consent, 149 PA. L. REV. 399 (2000); cf. Curtis A. Bradley, The Juvenile Death Penalty and
International Law, 52 DUKE L.J. 485, 509-11 (2002); Catherine Redgwell, US Reservations to Human Rights
Treaties: All for One and None for All?, in UNITED STATES HEGEMONY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 392 (Michael Byers & Georg Nolte, eds. 2003).
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Goodman, supra note __ at 531; Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note __, a 438.
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The selected remedy will also affect whether some states are willing to consent to human rights treaties
in the first place. See Goodman, supra note __, at 535-55.
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See International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Genocide Convention
(1951).
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effective control of the country. 117 Again, this is a thorny problem, but deciding which
approach is optimal will turn on the work one expects membership rules to perform (and,
of course, the effect we expect exclusion to have).118 The important point is that an
empirical question inheres in these doctrinal problems: what are the consequences of
restrictive membership. The following discussion examines the empirical foundations of
membership rules. For the sake of clarity, we focus on rules that directly restrict—either
through denial of admission or through expulsion—membership on the basis of human
rights performance.
This type of exercise is helpful in at least three ways. First, the social mechanism one
emphasizes (or tries to harness) might dictate whether and how to condition membership.
Second, close attention to social processes clarifies the trade-offs that would accompany
specific membership rules. Third, the social mechanism one emphasizes also implicates
various second-order determinations. For example, if a restrictive approach is adopted,
each of the mechanisms would suggest unique design principles with respect to the
substantive criteria and procedures for selecting, retaining, and potentially ousting
members.
A. Coercion
As Table II demonstrates, the coercion mechanism places a low or medium level of
importance on this design question. On one view, whether states act within or outside a
regime should not substantially affect the ability of stronger states to exert influence over
delinquent, weaker states.119 Another view is that high levels of regime participation can
yield nontrivial benefits: regimes help generate information about the distribution of state
preferences, develop reputations for compliance, and lower the transaction costs of
cooperation. 120 These effects promote stable cooperative arrangements in part because
they facilitate the efficient allocation of rewards and penalties.121

117
Cf. Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation in International Law, 17 YALE J. INT 'L L. 539,
605 (1992).
118
Inclusion of the de facto (but illegitimate) government signals acceptance of its authority—and perhaps
imbues it with some measure of legitimacy. Id. Exclusion, on the other hand, might sacrifice some measure
of influence over non-democratic governments. Id. at 605-06 (evaluating the claim that using accreditation
power of the General Assembly would “lose any leverage [the United Nations] might have to influence the
policies of excluded unelected governments”).
119
See, e.g., John Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions, 19 INT’L SECURITY 5
(Winter 1994/95); Joseph M. Grieco, Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the
Newest Liberal Institutionalism, 42 INT’L ORG. 485 (1988).
120
ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL
ECONOMY (1984); Robert O. Keohane & Lisa L. Martin, The Promise of Institutionalist Theory, 20 INT’L
SECURITY 39, 46-50 (1995). Accordingly, the regime itself would likely emphasize measures that accentuate
these features, such as reporting requirements and repeat interactions to help develop reputations.
121
We have isolated the different causal mechanisms for theoretical reasons explained above. Note,
however, that if legitimacy is also an empirically meaningful variable, inclusive membership may bolster the
effectiveness of coercive power. Specifically, some scholars who argue for the coercion paradigm (for
example, some neorealists) accept that legitimacy is a component of power. On this view, the use of sanctions
against a state that violates human rights might be viewed as more legitimate, and thus more effective, if the
target state has formally acceded to the relevant human rights obligations.
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The benefits of inclusion, however, must be weighed against the benefits of a
restrictive rule. Under the coercion mechanism, two advantages might be gained from
restrictive membership. First, conditioning admission on performance has an
information-forcing effect. The editors of a special issue of International Organization
thus hypothesize that rational regime designers are more likely to adopt a restrictive
membership rule under conditions of uncertainty about state preferences: “Membership
enables states to learn about each others’ preferences if the membership mechanism can
distinguish cooperators from non-cooperators. . . . Effective membership rules create a
separating equilibrium where only those who share certain characteristics will bear the
costs necessary to be included in an equilibrium.”122 Assuming that such information is
valued, rational regime designers should weigh (1) the information produced by a high
admissions bar against (2) the information produced by lowering the bar—allowing more
states to participate in the intra-regime organizational processes that generate information
over time. 123
Second, restricting membership to states with better human rights records might
facilitate deep cooperation among regime participants. George Downs et al. define the
depth of an agreement as “the extent to which [the agreement] requires states to depart
from what they would have done in its absence.”124 These scholars stress the utility of
coercive tools in ensuring cooperation among states,125 and they contend that only states
that are strongly committed to regime principles would ratify treaties requiring deep
change. 126 Naturally, they conclude that cooperative international regimes should restrict
membership to states that are prepared to undertake substantial obligations.127 It is
unclear whether this reasoning applies to human rights treaties (Downs et al. developed
the theory in the context of environmental regimes). As we describe in the Introduction,
human rights regimes do not fit neatly into cooperative models—there is no clear “free
rider” problem and states can, in a non-trivial sense, ensure human rights domestically
without the cooperation of other states. 128 As a consequence, the types of costs identified
122
Koremenos, et al., The Rational Design of International Institutions, supra note __, at 784; id. (“When
the price of membership is too low, membership is not informative.”); see also Koremenos et al., Rational
Design: Looking Back to Move Forward, 55 INT’L ORG. 1051 1056-57 (2001) (discussing results of
contributions to the special issue that support this conjecture); cf. Abbott & Snidal, supra note __, at 429.
123
Through this comparison, it is difficult to see why a rational institutional designer would invariably, or
more frequently, favor restrictive membership under conditions of uncertainty.
124
See George Downs, David Rocke & Peter Barsoom, Is the Good News about Compliance Good News
about Cooperation?, 50 INT’L ORG. 379, 383 (1996); see also Guzman, supra note __.
125
Id. at 386 & 391.
126
See, e.g., Downs, Rocke & Barsoom, supra note __, at 399 (“One possible strategy is to restrict regime
membership to states that will not have to defect very often. The idea is that whatever benefit is lost by
excluding such states from the regime will be more than made up by permitting those that are included to set
and also enforce a deeper level of cooperation.”).
127
Cf. George W. Downs, Kyle W. Danish & Peter Barsoom, Transformational Model of International
Regime Design: Triumph of Hope or Experience?, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT 'L L. 465, 508 (2000) (“[T]he
maximum amount of cooperation is likely to be achieved through the creation of a noninclusive regime that
contains a majority of the most cooperatively progressive states. Such regimes tend to establish an initial
level of cooperation that is relatively deep, whereas a more inclusive regime in which the average state had
yet to be affected … would do little or nothing.”).
128
One might incorrectly think that Downs’ analysis equally applies to human rights. Downs does apply
his argument to environmental regimes, see id., and, at first blush, the environmental context may appear to
raise the same concerns as human rights: The states least willing to control environmental degradation would
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by Downs et al. (viz. increased free-riding and/or the emergence of sub-optimal focal
points) are negligible in the human rights context.
It is also important to note an additional feature of human rights regimes that
mitigates this family of concerns. Because human rights protection does not require a
unified institutional framework, there are multiple, overlapping human rights treaty
regimes. 129 There are no fewer than four international human rights regimes: the global
regime (embodied in the UN system and the “International Bill of Rights” treaties) and
three regional systems. As a result, states can pursue multiple cooperative strategies
simultaneously—tailoring the membership rules of each regime to the specific goals of
the treaty system in question. Assume, for the sake of argument, that human rights
treaties solve some collective action problems—an assumption that makes plausible the
Downs et al. critique. Liberal states committed to “deep” cooperation on human rights
issues could jointly pursue multiple objectives. To capture the benefits of cooperation,
such states could establish a separate treaty regime with (1) robust substantive
commitments and (2) restricted membership. To capture the “non-cooperative” benefits
of constructive engagement, these states could also pursue a global regime with (1) more
modest substantive commitments and (2) unrestricted membership.130
If a restrictive approach were adopted, the coercion mechanism suggests certain
procedures for applying the membership rule. Specifically, it would make sense to design
the admission process to yield particular types of information. The regime might, for
example, target information that is otherwise difficult to detect. Candidate states could be
required to provide information on death in custody or statistics on racially disparate
social conditions. 131 The important point is that the analysis of mechanisms informs not
be omitted from a restrictive regime. However, this is not necessarily the case. In the environmental context,
the states more willing to join a restrictive regime (“cooperatively progressive” states) may also be the states
with greater environmental problems (or there may be no association between environmental degradation and
being a cooperatively progressive state). However, if a restrictive rule entails that outsiders are the ones most
likely to exhibit the problem (environmental degradation, human rights abuses, etc.), Downs’ argument is less
persuasive. Cf. Downs, Rocke, & Barsoom, supra note __, at 399 (“The idea is that whatever benefit is lost
by excluding such states from the regime will be more than made up by permitting those that are included to
set and also enforce a deeper level of cooperation.”).
129
Overlapping, inconsistent rights regimes can coexist because the regulatory problem they address is
unidirectional. That is, rights regimes seek to maximize the protection of individual rights—subject only to
the other necessities of good governance. Rights regimes regulate only under-protection of rights, not their
over-protection. Consider a stylized example. Assume that regime X protects rights at level 10 and regime Y
protects rights at level 5. All states willing to protect rights at level 10 could lawfully participate in both
regimes.
130
This is an important point because it goes a long way toward dispelling one potential problem with our
model. As we note in the Introduction, one purpose of international human rights regimes is to improve the
practices of illiberal states. There are, however, other important objectives of human rights regimes. For
example, international rights regimes might empower national governments to “lock in” certain levels of
rights protection—allowing national leaders to consolidate gains in liberalization and democratization. See
Andrew Moravscik, The Origin of Human Rights Regimes, 54 INT’L ORG. (2000). As the discussion in the
text suggests, these goals can be pursued within the context of a regional regime—or a regime organized
around some other salient state characteristic. Indeed, Moravscik’s important study documents how some
national governments utilized the European human rights regime for this purpose. See id.
131
U.N. monitoring bodies have had difficulty acquiring this type of information. See, e.g., Michael
Banton, United Nations Background Paper, The Causes of, and Remedies for, Racial Discrimination, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/1999/WG.1/BP.6 (Feb. 26, 1999) (member of the treaty body for the Racism Convention,
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only the decision whether to adopt a restrictive rule, it also informs the administration of
such a rule.
B. Persuasion
The persuasion mechanism suggests a moderate level of importance for this
particular design question. Properly considered, persuasion—like coercion—can and does
occur outside international organizations.132 Treaty regimes do accord, however, some
structural opportunities for persuasion. Moreover, international human rights regimes
help liberal states coordinate their efforts at persuasive diplomacy. Typically, those who
emphasize the value of persuasion also suggest membership should be inclusive.133 Broad
treaty membership, on this view, would lower transaction costs and facilitate
opportunities for collective deliberation and dialogue. The primary advantage of
unrestricted membership is that it enmeshes illiberal states in regularized communicative
processes.134 In addition, the interdisciplinary “communicative action” literature suggests
that open debate and constructive dialogue would push states toward a progressive
realization of human rights.135 Under this approach, restrictive membership rules risk deinstitutionalization by foregrounding disagreements without providing a constructive
institutional setting in which these disagreements could be debated.136 In fact, restrictive
rules are often perceived as crude punitive measures. Chayes and Chayes, for example,
classify restrictive membership rules exclusively within the rubric of “sanctions.”137
Similarly, Rodger Payne contends that measures implying “participant rank” introduce a
wholly undesirable “warping factor” into persuasive settings.138 The argument for
inclusiveness in this literature, however, is often based on the theory that broad-based
membership will exert stronger and more authoritative “community pressure” on

explaining difficulties in obtaining data from governments on dimensions of racial discrimination) available
at <www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/a0a298536f43dc51802567a5005a1d09?Opendocument> (last
visited July 20, 2003).
132
Some commentators may overestimate the importance of treaty regimes for pro-social persuasion. See
Downs, Danish & Barsoom, supra note __, at 496-97 (criticizing scholars for trumpeting processes of
persuasion within international organizations without considering alternative opportunities for persuasion in
the wider regime); but cf. Keck and Sikkink, supra note __ (describing transnational processes of persuasion
including but not limited to formal organizations); Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International
Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT 'L L. 1 (2002)
(analyzing importance of networks outside formal organizations and treaties); Koh, supra note __ (describing
multiple forums and processes apart from international organizations).
133
See Downs, Danish & Barsoom, supra note __, at 477-78 (describing the literature); see also Chayes &
Chayes, supra note __, at 68; PATRICIA W. BIRNIE & ALAN E. BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 175 (1992).
134
Of course the nature of the forum would accordingly need to foster these types of interactions.
135
Thomas Risse, “Let’s Argue!”: Communicative Action in World Politics, 54 INT’L ORG. 1 (2000); cf.
Reus-Smit, supra note __, at 526.
136
Chayes & Chayes, supra note __, at 69 (“[D]isputes about membership necessarily imposed costs in
terms of regime performance.”); id. at 85 (“The very effort to impose sanctions [through membership status],
even when it is successful, turns into a major issue, disrupts the work of the organization and generates
dissatisfaction and resentment among supporters as well as opponents of the action.”). Cf. Rodger A. Payne,
Persuasion, Frames and Norm Construction, 7 EUR. J. OF INT’L RELATIONS 37 (2001) (borrowing from
Habermas in discussing noxious effects of using coercive tools with ongoing processes of persuasion).
137
Chayes & Chayes, supra note __, at 68-87.
138
Payne, supra note __, at 47.
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recalcitrant states.139 Such a proposition, however, describes (within the four corners of
our model) the mechanism of acculturation, which involves a different set of assumptions
and implications.
On the other hand, the mechanics of persuasion mechanism suggest some non-trivial
advantages of restricted membership. For example, exclusion of illiberal states from
human rights regimes can promote “issue salience” for domestic audiences. This
increased salience empowers human rights advocacy networks to shape the local political
agenda by alerting others to these issues and exposing inconsistencies in current
priorities. 140 The important point is that “negative” events—such as exclusion or
expulsion from a human rights regime—can inspire social movement mobilization.141
If a restrictive approach were adopted, the mechanics of persuasion would also
suggest how best to make membership determinations. The process initiated by such a
membership regime would, on this view, provide multiple opportunities for “framing”
human rights issues. For example, membership criteria (and the negotiations triggered by
them) might target issue areas that might not have received adequate attention on the
international stage (such as indigenous rights, or the legality of extraterritorial human
rights violations). The important comparative point is that this “negotiating” process—
understood by the coercion approach as transaction costs—is, in the persuasion approach,
an advantage in that it provides structural opportunities for productive exchange and
“teaching.”
C. Acculturation
Unlike the other two approaches, the acculturation mechanism suggests that
membership rules are of high importance. On this view, broad membership would
amplify social pressure. Broad membership would also help substantiate the claim that
the principled commitments of the regime are, indeed, universal. Moreover, one of the
principal empirical insights of acculturation studies is that the degree to which states are
embedded in international organizations is strongly associated with the state’s conformity
to global models of appropriate behavior.142 Participation in international institutions thus
plays a significant role in promoting standardized, pro-social models.143 Importantly,
institutions with broad membership advance the social processes by which states adopt
139

See, e.g., Birnie & Boyle, supra note __, at 175 (“These are institutions in which community pressure is
arguably at its strongest because of their broadly drawn membership ....”).
140
KECK & SIKKINK, supra note __, at 24-27.
141
William A. Gamson & David S. Meyer, Framing Political Opportunity, in COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES
ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES, MOBILIZING STRUCTURES, AND CULTURAL F RAMINGS 275
(Doug McAdam, et al., eds. 1996). For example, the denial of Turkey’s admission to the European Union
might assist domestic human rights movements in promoting long-term reforms.
142
John W. Meyer, et al., World Society and the Nation-State, supra note __, at 144 (1997); Martha
Finnemore, Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology’s Institutionalism, 50 INT’L ORG.
325 (1996); see also supra text accompanying notes __-__.
143
Michael N. Barnett & Martha Finnemore, The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International
Organizations, 53 INT’L ORG. 699 (1999); MARTHA FINNEMORE, NATIONAL INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL
SOCIETY (1996).
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norms identified with being a “modern state.”144 Accordingly, the mechanism of
acculturation—unlike coercion and persuasion—operates much more effectively, and
sometimes necessarily, through international organizations.
Several additional reasons for inclusive membership under this approach bear
mentioning. First, inclusive membership encourages illiberal states to define and justify
their resistance to global norms in terms of the treaty. To guard against retrenchment, for
example, disputes over rights protection should occur within the terms of global models
of legitimate state objectives. In practice, human rights treaties often contain provisions
that delineate acceptable governmental restrictions on particular rights, such as
derogation and limitation clauses. The inclusion of illiberal states within these
frameworks should facilitate the institutionalization of globally legitimated restrictions.
Exclusion, on the other hand, may encourage parochial or idiosyncratic modes of
resistance to human rights norms. The important point is that these “escape clauses”
encourage state participation in human rights regimes and increase the acceptability of
various institutionalized forms of state reporting and third-party evaluation. Moreover,
states can—through the use of these devices—meaningfully participate in the treaty
regime because many state interests (even if idiosyncratic or highly controversial) can be
expressed within the terms of the treaty.145
Second, the logic of acculturation, in contrast with the other approaches,146 highlights
the importance of discouraging certain relationships that can arise between organizational
insiders and outsiders. As a model of culture, the acculturation approach predicts the
institutionalization of deviance within subcultures that can form outside dominant modes
of legitimated behavior. Indeed, acculturation studies explain variation between states by
showing that adherence to dominant norms is associated with levels of participation in
international institutions and organizations.147 For example, these studies suggest that
states with fewer connections to international bodies (e.g., Burma and North Korea) will
be more likely to adopt aberrant official policies and forms of governance. Furthermore,
the forces of social pressure and orthodoxy that occur within global institutions can also
occur within smaller communities—e.g., Asia-Pacific states with low participation in
international human rights forums—thus propelling local standards partly defined in
contradistinction to dominant conventions.
144

See, e.g., Martha Finnemore, Institutional Organizations as Teachers of Norms: The United Nations
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and Science Policy, 47 INT’L ORG. 565 (1993).
145
This suggests an important, and potentially problematic, difference between the mechanics of
acculturation and persuasion. The acculturation approach is agnostic about the “truth-finding” capacities of
social interaction. Under the persuasion approach, on the other hand, “communicative action” theory
suggests (either expressly or impliedly) that greater rights protections will emerge from well-structured
discourse among states. Downs, Danish & Barsoom, supra note __, at 474 (explaining that this area of
scholarship appears to consider a set of prescribed processes “relentlessly progressive”). The acculturation
model, instead, emphasizes cultural and associational factors that shape the definition and transmission of
socially-accepted behavior.
146
Recall that under the coercion and persuasion approaches, gains to insiders are largely absolute and
localized; they do not impose costs on outsiders. The only question we raised in that respect involved the
denial of organizational benefits to outsiders. The organizational benefits to insiders do not affect the
relationships between insiders and outsiders or the nature of outsiders’ attitude or behavior due to their
exclusion.
147
See supra text accompanying notes __-__.
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Finally, an acculturation approach evaluates “defections” by states inside the
organization differently than the other approaches. First, an acculturation approach
predicts certain patterns of defection not envisioned by the others, and it thus evaluates
the cost of defection on regime maintenance very differently. The coercion approach, for
example, raises the concern that including states with lower commitments to regime
objectives will prove unworkable due to frequent defection within the forum.148 The
persuasion approach predicts few meaningful defections will occur and considers
defection in exclusively unfavorable terms.149 An acculturation approach, in contrast,
predicts that defections will occur and may be somewhat salutary. Specifically, it predicts
that pressure to conform will produce a particular form of defection: structural adherence
to globally institutionalized models that do not correspond with actual state practices on
the ground. As we have argued elsewhere, 150 this disconnect between local circumstances
and universal models is not an impediment to the diffusion of global norms, as other
theories would suggest. Rather, the diffusion of global models and the resultant
convergence of policies and organizational structure are, in important respects, made
possible by this form of decoupling. The important point here is that the acculturation
mechanism predicts a peculiar form of defection and that this form of defection assists
the diffusion of norms.
The mechanics of acculturation also suggest potential advantages to a restrictive rule.
First, membership itself can serve as a device for affirmation or censure. That is,
inclusion can provide a form of back-patting, while exclusion can shame and shun. In a
related context, Anne-Marie Slaughter has advocated calibrating the application of
doctrines of judicial deference according to different forms of government. She proposed
that national courts exercise jurisdiction over the acts of liberal foreign states but abstain
from reviewing the acts of illiberal foreign states.151 Slaughter contends that the result of
shielding illiberal states from judicial scrutiny entails “salving their sovereign
sensitivities, but at the price of … moral ostracism from the liberal community.”152
Indeed, her proposal is designed to confer a “badge of alienage” on illiberal states and a
“badge of legitimacy” on liberal states.153 While substantial empirical evidence now
suggests these categories are socially meaningful, 154 Slaughter does not consider
countervailing effects within the terms of the same social logic. That is, the same body of
empirical work provides strong reasons for bringing recalcitrant states into the fold.
Specifically, as discussed above, processes of assimilation suggest illiberal states will
begin to imitate the group in which they are included. On this view, “identification” with
other members—not banishment from the group—is perhaps more likely to propel the
legal and political systems of illiberal states toward conformity with prevailing norms.155
148

Downs, Rocke & Barsoom, supra note __, at 398-99.
See Raustiala & Slaughter, supra note __, at 543; cf. George Downs, David Rocke, & Peter Barsoom,
supra note __, at 379 (criticizing this prediction of noncompliance).
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See Goodman & Jinks, Toward an Institutional Theory of Sovereignty, supra note __, at 1761.
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See Anne-Marie Burley [Slaughter], Law Among Liberal States: Liberal Internationalism and the Act of
State Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1907 (1992).
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Id. at 1991.
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Id. at 1990-92.
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See supra text accompanying notes __-__.
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Notably, Slaughter’s more recent work largely abandons this earlier model. Slaughter’s influential work
on transgovernmental networks, for example, does not sharply distinguish between liberal and illiberal states.
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Second, the acculturation approach suggests that restrictive membership might foster
greater affinity among insiders—thus accelerating processes of norm diffusion within the
group. The social meaning of exclusivity—created by the restriction itself—should
intensify forms of identification. And, if the substantive criteria for membership include
human rights performance, identification is likely to develop along the axis of that
defining feature. However, such dynamics improve the situation only for states willing
and able to join the organization. Although we discussed a similar difficulty with the
coercion approach (that gains only accrue to insiders),156 this result is especially
problematic in the context of acculturation. Widening disparities between insiders and
outsiders might culminate in standards that are unrealistically high for illiberal states;
thus the probability that these states will “identify” with insiders is diminished
substantially.
Finally, substantial evidence from social psychology suggests that small groups often
facilitate processes of acculturation. Note initially that this effect is often described as
“persuasion” in the literature, but the mechanics of this social process mirror what we call
“acculturation.”157 In discussing international institutions, for example, Iain Johnston
notes that “ideal persuasion is likely to be the most prevalent and powerful socialization
process when membership is small (social liking and in-group identity effects on the
persuasiveness of counter-attitudinal messages are strongest).”158 Notwithstanding the
persuasion label, this view clearly suggests that small group size promotes
“acculturation” because small groups are more likely to foster intimate, high-affect
exchanges. Regimes with restricted membership, on this theory, should facilitate
convergence of practices.159 The degree to which this insight is applicable to human
rights treaty regimes, however, is questionable. The identified advantages issue only from
the size of the group. As such, this literature is non-specific in that it offers no guidance
on any other defining characteristic of membership regimes. For example, the “small
group” effect does not necessarily support the view that regime members should be
selected on the basis of human rights performance—and were it otherwise, acculturation
would prove most effective where it is needed least (with high performance states). In
addition, persuasive encounters—such as bilateral or trilateral diplomatic exchanges—
may occur in “small group settings” irrespective of the size of the treaty regime writ
large. Notably, the potential benefits of small group size have largely escaped scholarly
consideration due to analytic slippage and a failure to isolate causal mechanisms.

Also, as we note above, Slaughter’s project on transgovernmentalism relies centrally on notions of
persuasion. See supra note __.
156
See supra text accompanying notes __-__.
157
This is yet another important example of conceptual slippage in the literature along the
persuasion/acculturation divide. See supra note ____ (describing this conceptual slippage at an abstract
level).
158
Johnston, supra note __, at 509.
159
Johnston risks the same framing error that we discussed with respect to the coercion paradigm. See
supra text accompanying notes __-__. That is, focusing on institutional effectiveness in this manner displaces
the wider regime and implications for excluded states. An exclusionary organization may enhance the social
environment for insiders. But, especially with respect to human rights, one should weigh the benefits of
significantly enhanced effectiveness for member states against lowering the bar and allowing more states to
benefit from—overall less effective—participation.
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On balance, the features of acculturation support inclusive membership. However, if
a restrictive rule were adopted, the principles of acculturation would favor particular
criteria in applying the rule. First, the acculturation approach would suggest requiring
only a de minimus demonstration of human rights performance. Second, qualifying
criteria for new entrants might be used to encourage candidate states to establish
institutional arrangements that foster subsequent structural opportunities for diffusion of
global norms. The acculturation literature suggests particular domestic arrangements can
(unintentionally) accelerate diffusion. For example, David John Frank et al. identify
“receptor sites”160—in the case of the environment, scientific institutes—that facilitate the
local transmission of global normative models. In our context, a national human rights
commission is a close analog. Hence, admission to the intergovernmental organization
might be conditioned on (or highly favor) establishing such an institution. In a similar
vein, an intergovernmental organization might require or encourage candidate states to
establish a human rights ombudsman or a human rights unit in the foreign ministry to
interface with the organization. The basic idea is to promote institutional arrangements
that, according to this behavioral logic, should produce a multiplier effect in the
transmission and diffusion of human rights norms.

160
David John Frank, Ann Hironaka & Evan Schofer, The Nation-State and the Natural Environment over
the Twentieth Century, 65 AM. SOC. REV. 96, 96 n. 1 (2000) (“Receptor sites are social structures (e.g.,
scientific institutes) with the capacity to recievem decode, and transmit signals from the world society to
national actors.”); see also David John Frank, Ann Hironaka & Evan Schofer, Environmentalism as a Global
Institution, 65 AM. SOC. REV. 122 (2000).
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Table II: Conditional Membership161
IMPORTANCE
Coercion

INCLUSIVE

RESTRICTIVE

POTENTIALLY
LOW OR MEDIUM

1. Repeat interactions
increase information

(no special substantive
effect -- can exercise
coercion on bilateral
basis)

2. Repeat interactions
decrease cheating (by
fostering future gains
and developing
reputations for
compliance)

1. Membership rule =
information-forcing
device revealing
willingness and capacity
of states to join
organization163

3. Institutional setting
decreases transaction
costs in gaining
information and
making agreements

2. Smaller membership
involves lower
transaction costs in
management of
organization (but benefits
accrue only to liberal
states inside the
organization)

4. Process of
reviewing membership
involves transaction
cost
NOTE: A reason for
inclusiveness exists if
the size of membership
increases the amount
of rewards and
penalties for
members162

Persuasion

MEDIUM

1. Promotes
opportunities for
discussion, argument,
debate

Exclusion increases issue
salience (e.g., with
domestic audiences)

2. Lowers transaction
costs of collective
communication and
exchange
3. Process of applying
membership rules
undermines
deliberative
atmosphere

161
Assumptions include: (1) sufficiently high human rights standards within regime; (2) a principal
concern is changing behavior of governments engaged in frequent and severe human rights violations.
162
Also, issue-linkage within the regime (linking human rights compliance with material rewards or
penalties) would provide a stronger reason for a more inclusive rule.
163
If issue-linkage includes rewards for mere membership, a stronger reason exists for a restrictive rule.
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Acculturation

HIGH

1. Strong social effects
on insiders
(embeddedness in
regimes promotes
conformity)
2. Regulates forms of
resistance
3. Avoids creating
subculture of outsiders
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1. Membership itself is
device for conferring
legitimacy and ostracism
2. Membership rule
strengthens affinity
among insiders
3. Process of reviewing
membership has
institutionalizing benefits

4. Promotes message
of universality in norm
enunciation
5. Larger membership
maximizes social
pressure (cumulative
effect for back-patting
and shaming)
RISK: high prevalence
of violations among
insiders risks
institutionalizing
undesirable behavior

III. PRECISION OF OBLIGATIONS
Another important choice in human rights regime design concerns the level of
precision164 used to define state obligations. Scholars consider “[p]recision and
elaboration … especially significant hallmarks of legalization at the international
level.”165 The issue of precision has accordingly become a prominent topic in the study of
international institutions.166 Similar to a debate over legal formalism in domestic law, 167
164

We use a standard definition of precision: “Precision means that rules unambiguously define the
conduct they require, authorize, or proscribe.” Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54
INT’L ORG. 401, 401 (2000); id. at 412 (“A precise rule specifies clearly and unambiguously what is expected
of a state or other actor (in terms of both the intended objective and the means of achieving it) in a particular
set of circumstances. In other words, precision narrows the scope for reasonable interpretation.”).
165
Abbott et. al., supra note __, at 414.
166
For example, in 2000, International Organization—the leading international relations journal—devoted
a special issue to the topic of legalization. The authors of the volume identified “precision” as one of three
characteristics for evaluating the concept of legalization across international institutions. Goldstein et al.,
Introduction: Legalization and World Politics, 54 INT’L ORG. 385 (2000). Issues of “determinacy” figure
prominently in Thomas Franck’s influential study of international legal compliance. FRANCK, LEGITIMACY,
supra note __, at 50-90.
167
Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism be Defended Empirically?, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 636 (1999).
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these debates in international law persist without an adequate understanding of the
connection between prescriptive claims and empirical assumptions. That is,
commentators have argued for—or against—precision without due regard to the manner
in which their ostensibly normative claims are tethered to undefended or unexamined
empirical propositions.
Consider, for example, the debates about whether treaties or customary international
law provide a better vehicle for regulating state practice. As David Kennedy remarks in a
more critical voice, “Are international norms best built by custom or treaty? International
lawyers have worried about this for at least a century, one or the other mode coming in
and out of fashion at various points.”168 Kennedy suggests these debates repeat
themselves across generations of international legal scholars without moving matters
forward. One reason for this repetition without progression may be the failure to specify
and trace the significance of relevant behavioral logics. For example, according to some
commentators, because treaties generally provide a level of specification that is difficult
to obtain through custom, treaties are better devices for regulating state behavior.169
However, without empirical support, that assessment is largely conjecture. We would
need to know whether, how, and under what conditions normative and legal precision
actually influences state behavior. And we would want to identify gaps in empirical
information required to assess the social effects of precision. Whether states are likely
under certain conditions to try to obfuscate their human rights obligations, to evaluate
obligations deliberatively, or to mimic obligations should inform this debate.
The language used to define obligations in human rights treaties is notoriously vague
compared with other legal domains.170 A common view is that human rights treaties
should aspire to greater levels of precision to foster compliance and enforcement.171
Others caution, however, that ambiguity can help build consensus in the treaty drafting

168

David Kennedy, When Renewal Repeats: Thinking Against the Box, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT 'L L. & POL. 335
(2000).
169
See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV.
1823, 1876 (2002) (“Because CIL’s content is uncertain, states can often claim to have complied even when
they have ignored the content of CIL. In other words, the commitment to CIL is more easily avoided than the
commitment to treaty.”); id. at 1877 (“Problems of clarity and a lack of explicit commitment on the part of
states make CIL weaker than treaties.”); id. at 1873 & 1876-77; OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE 66 (1991) (“It is easy to see the advantages of that process. ... In place of the
uncertain and slow process of custom, … [t]he text brings clarity and precision where there had been
obscurity and doubt.”); id. at 71 (theorizing a “bureaucratic factor” that encourages the application of treaties
because “[t]he law is declared in a concise and definitive form that is highly convenient for lawyers and
officials.”).
170
Louise Doswald-Beck & Sylvian Vité, International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, 293
INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 94 (1993) (“[T]he major difficulty of applying human rights law as enunciated
in the treaties is the very general nature of the treaty language.”).
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See, e.g., Bruno Simma, A Hard Look at Soft Law, 82 AM. SOC'Y INT 'L L. PROC. 371, 378 (1988)
(“What I have just said will be feasible, however, only if and to the degree that human rights treaty provisions
are actually susceptible to violations in the sense that infringements of treaty provisions can be determined
clearly. … Indeed, international human rights treaties are not notorious for the precision of their wording;
they contain many vague and ambiguous provisions … It will not be easy to localize clear-cut violations of
such provisions”).
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process.172 The issue of precision should thus be evaluated along two dimensions: ex post
effects on compliance and ex ante effects on legislative processes. The following
discussion analyzes the issue along those lines.
A. Coercion
Precision offers a number of advantages according to the coercion approach. A
general assumption of the approach is that states act to maximize their own material wellbeing. Precision is therefore a valuable device for constraining “self-serving autointerpretation”173—thereby discouraging free-riding and clearly defining what counts as
cooperative moves. The precise delineation of proscribed behavior can also help
maximize reputational effects of compliance and non-compliance. That is, the
reputational costs of human rights violations (which may in turn translate into material
costs) are made more certain by reducing potential interpretive disputes over whether a
state has fulfilled its obligations.174 Reputational effects can be particularly important in a
human rights regime: the coercion approach assumes little else but procuring benefits or
avoiding penalties will constrain behavior. Moreover, if “reputational effects of a
violation can be generalized to all agreements subject to international law”175—that is, if
violations of a human rights treaty can damage a state’s overall reputation as a treaty
partner—then human rights regimes can piggyback on issue areas in which states value
their reputations more highly.176 Finally, because precision raises the costs of defection, it
enhances the ability of regime participants to gauge the credibility of commitments—the
act of ratifying a treaty with high levels of precision signals a willingness and capacity to
make the grade.177
Under the coercion approach, the most important cost of precision is its ex ante
effects on treaty negotiations. Commentators suggest that ambiguity facilitates agreement
in drafting stages. Indeed, Abbott and Snidal, contend that ambiguity can be “a major
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Chayes & Chayes, supra note __, at 11; FRANCK, LEGITIMACY, supra note __, at 52-53; Abbot &
Snidal, supra note __, at 434, 444-45.
173
Abbot & Snidal, supra note __, at 427.
174
Guzman, supra note __, at 1863 (“The clarity of both the international obligation and its violation are
important because a failure to live up to an international obligation triggers a reputational loss. The
reputational consequences are most severe when the obligation is clear and the violation is unambiguous. As
the uncertainty of an obligation increases, the reputational cost from a violation decreases.”).
175
Abbot & Snidal, supra note __, at 427 (“When a commitment is cast as hard law, the reputational
effects of a violation can be generalized to all agreements subject to international law, that is, to most
international agreements.”); Keohane, supra note __, at 106 (“For reasons of reputation, as well as fear of
retaliation and concerns about the effects of precedents, egoistic governments may follow the rules and
principles of international regimes even when myopic self-interest counsels them not to….[T]hey might often
decide, in light of this cost-benefit calculation, to conform to the rules. ”); but see George W. Downs &
Michael A. Jones, Reputation, Compliance, and International Law, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 95, 95-96 (2002)
(disputing the influence of reputational effects of noncompliance across regimes); Weisburd, supra note __ at
104.
176
See also Guzman, supra note __ at (discussing impact of reputational loss on capacity to extract
concessions in negotiating future agreements).
177
Abbot & Snidal, supra note __, at 427.
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advantage”178 in lowering contracting costs and that, in some circumstances, insisting on
precision “may prevent agreement altogether.”179 The important point is that states will
find it easier to build consensus at a higher level of abstraction.
B. Persuasion
The persuasion approach generally favors greater precision in the definition of legal
obligations. It is important to note that commentators relying on this mechanism often
acknowledge that imprecision may be necessary in the drafting and ratification processes.
Nevertheless, these commentators argue that regime participants should endeavor to
“concretize” treaty terms over time on the view that specificity facilitates persuasive
interactions and norm internalization.180 These calls for evolutionary precision are
typically tethered to recommendations concerning how best to design dispute resolution
mechanisms—and, at times, are directed not to treaty makers but to actors and
institutions created by the treaty (such as the independent experts serving on so-called
treaty bodies). Because these proposals are so closely tethered to implementation
strategies, we analyze them more fully in our discussion of enforcement in Part IV.
The important point for now is that persuasion-centered approaches emphasize the
value of precision. For example, Chayes and Chayes argue that much non-compliance is
caused by imprecision in the framing of obligations: “[A]mbiguity and indeterminacy of
treaty language,” they contend, “lie at the root of much of the behavior that may seem to
violate treaty requirements.”181 Under the persuasion approach, rules are most useful if
they sharply reduce uncertainty about the content of obligations. In general, precise rules
help clarify points of agreement and disagreement—facilitating targeted debates in which
agreement on clearly-defined obligations provides a normative framework within which
the parties might move toward agreement. Recall that the touchstone of this approach is
that states internalize human rights norms following an active assessment of the claims
made on behalf of these norms. On this view, it is the content of the rule that is assessed
and, ideally, internalized. In this sense, the precision of legal obligations is central to the
project of persuasion. As a comparison, the acculturation approach tolerates greater
disparity between rule-acceptance and actual practice; under certain conditions states will
accede to obligations in order to avoid social ostracism or to conform to orthodoxy—the
obligation does not require precision to be accepted and (under some conditions) to be
applied.
More specifically, framing strategies analogize controversial practices to one or more
clearly prohibited practice. In this sense, reasoning by analogy carries persuasive force
only if the “frame” itself is well-defined. Similarly, the strategy of “cueing actors to think
178
Abbot & Snidal, supra note __, at 434; see also id. at 436 (“In general, we hypothesize that softer forms
of legalization will be more attractive to states as contracting costs increase.”); id. at 444-45.
179
Id.
180
Cf. Abbot & Snidal, supra note __, at 445 (“Over time, if the soft arrangements are successful and
without adverse consequences, the initially reluctant states may accept harder legalization.”).
181
Chayes & Chayes, supra note __, at 10; id. at 126-27; cf. Raustiala, supra note __, at 78
(“Managerialism…argues that the primary drivers of non-compliance are actually rule ambiguity and,
especially, lack of domestic regulatory capacity.”).
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harder” about controversial practices relies upon the precision of some underlying
obligations. Recall that this tactic works because the persuadee is forced to confront and
reconcile inconsistencies in stated positions. This strategy is unlikely to prompt in the
persuadee an active reevaluation of controversial practices if inconsistencies are easily
resolved because the underlying norms are highly malleable.
We should also say a bit more about the various intra-regime contexts in which
persuasive encounters might take place. First, the very exercise of drafting a legal
instrument (such as treaties, resolutions, declarations) provides an important opportunity
for persuasive encounters. In the course of drafting text, debates over the specific
definition of legal obligations are viewed as productive. Many commentators underscore
the importance of these occasions as opportunities to enunciate norms: “They
[substantive norms] are elaborated and given more concrete and specific form so that
parties can more readily adapt their conduct.”182 In short, as with membership procedures
discussed above, a seemingly arduous process—understood in the coercion model as
transaction costs—is understood as a benefit in the persuasion model. The process affords
valuable opportunities for discourse and exchange.183
Second, persuasive encounters occur in the administration of the regime—in the
course of applying rules to specific practices. That many structural opportunities for such
encounters exist suggests ex ante precision is less important than one might otherwise
suppose. That is, states could draft imprecise rules and defer the process of specification
to subsequent, intra-regime encounters. This deferral typically involves delegation of
interpretive authority to a dispute resolution or supervisory body established by the
treaty. Abbott and Snidal explain that “[d]elegation is often the best way to deal with
incomplete contracting problems,” that is, states can “utilize administrative … institutions
to interpret and extend broad legal principles.”184 The mechanics of persuasion suggest
some non-trivial virtues of deferral. Most importantly, deferral can provide structural
opportunities for reflection, application, justification, and argument. “The discursive
elaboration and application of treaty norms is the heart of the compliance process.… In
the course of debate, the performance required of a party in a particular case is
progressively defined and specified.”185 That is, broad standards can furnish a general
template against which “seemingly endless discussion of the scope and meaning of
norms” can take place—an important, even if counter-intuitive, benefit.186 Perhaps most
significantly, enmeshing rights-violating states in active interpretation and justification
should facilitate the effectiveness of persuasion. 187
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Chayes & Chayes, supra note __, at 126.
Id. at 123 (“The participants seek, almost in Socratic fashion, to persuade each other of the validity of
the successive steps in the dialectic.”).
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Abbot & Snidal, supra note __, at 433.
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Chayes & Chayes, supra note __, at 123.
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Id. at 126 (“The seemingly endless discussion of the scope and meaning of norms in the formal
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Risse, supra note __; Chayes & Chayes, supra note __, at 126; cf. STANLEY COHEN, STATES OF DENIAL :
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C. Acculturation
The acculturation model departs significantly from canonical approaches to the “level
of precision” problem. International instruments are often “remarkably precise and dense,
presumably because proponents believe that these characteristics enhance their normative
and political value.”188 The other two behavioral models exhibit this line of thinking. For
those approaches, obtaining precision is generally considered essential to the long term
effectiveness of the regime. For these approaches, the major cost associated with
precision is that it complicates ex ante negotiations—making it more difficult to obtain
initial commitments from illiberal (or weakly liberal) states. In short, precision (1)
promotes compliance, but it also (2) increases transaction costs. Under the acculturation
approach, however, both effects are potentially reversed: imprecision will sometimes help
to produce behavioral conformity; and precision might reduce ex ante negotiating costs.
In other words, strategic imprecision is valuable ex post and costly ex ante.
We should say more about both of these points. The first—that imprecision promotes
behavioral conformity ex post—requires an important qualification. Here, it is necessary
to distinguish the two types of acculturation discussed earlier: conformity due to
cognitive cues and conformity due to social sanctions. Both types of acculturation predict
pro-social behavior. That is, behavioral regularities do not issue from the content of the
relevant rule or norm, rather they are a function of social structure—the relations between
individual actors and some reference group(s). Conformity depends less on the properties
of the rule than on the properties of the relationship of the actor to the community.
Because the convention is associated in general terms with the identity of the group, rules
best foster conformity by “establish[ing] broad hortatory goals with few specific
proscribed or prescribed activities.”189 This effect, so described, suggests that imprecision
mobilizes “cognitive pressures” to adopt pro-social behavior (the first type of
acculturation). Precision, on the other hand, is more likely to emphasize disagreements—
triggering cognitive cues that the would-be reference group is importantly dissimilar from
the target actor.190 There are, nevertheless, good reasons to suspect that precision might
facilitate social rewards and sanctions—the second type of acculturation. One problem is
that constructivist scholarship on the subject has not carefully distinguished the two types
of acculturation (even when acculturation is distinguished from persuasion). Therefore,
the value of precision has been obscured.
Thomas Franck’s discussion of “determinacy”191 helps explain the distinction and
potential benefits to precision. Franck discusses how precise rules promote compliance—
emphasizing the social value of precision. His analysis of precision, however, generally
suggests the latter type of acculturation—the distribution of social sanctions. According
188

Abbott et al., supra note __ at 414; see also FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note __,
at 30-31 (“Rules which have a readily assessable meaning and which say what they expect of those who are
address are more likely to have a real impact on conduct.”).
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Mitchell, supra note __, at 46.
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The literature here is substantial. See, e.g., Zucker, Institutional Theories of Organization, supra note
__.
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FRANCK, LEGITIMACY, supra note __, at 52.
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to Franck, precision strengthens the perceived fairness (and legitimacy) of a rule because
“it is thought fairer to impose rights and duties which can be understood and anticipated
by those to whom they are addressed than to impose rights and duties which leave the
reader unable to anticipate the vagaries of interpretation.”192 Target states are accordingly
more likely to accept the social sanction as legitimate, and other states are more likely to
sponsor sanctions. In addition, Franck suggests that the determinacy of a rule will narrow
the range of permissible interpretations, and thus assist in the regulatory effects of social
sanctions. He contends that states, in trying to avoid the wrath of the community, will
attempt to evade the application of a rule by “‘interpreting’ the rule permissively’” and
“using clever sophistry.”193 Precision limits that possibility.
We agree that precision may strengthen social pressure by enhancing the legitimacy
of a sanction. In that respect, an acculturation approach would value precision. Franck,
however, undervalues (or fails to consider) the interplay between the two types of
acculturation. Effective social sanctions (and rewards) require that target actors value the
judgment of some reference group. Indeed, it is the approval of, or status in, this
reference group that the target actor seeks. If precision outstrips the institutionalized
preferences and expectations of target actors, then it disserves acculturation. As described
above, too much precision risks de-institutionalization.194
Moreover, Franck’s concern over self-serving and evasive interpretations does not fit
neatly in the conceptual apparatus of the second type of acculturation. Indeed, cognitive
pressures suggest that states may be more inclined to conform their behavior to
community expectations—and they are unlikely to sustain, over the long term, an
idiosyncratic interpretation of any norm considered central to the international
community. The motivation to mimic the reference group is also “self-directed.” Indeed,
states will even adopt legitimated practices under conditions of little or no surveillance by
the international community. 195 On this view, it is inaccurate to suggest that states
embedded in international organizations will invariably engage in “unilateral, self-serving
exculpatory interpretations … of [] rules by interested parties.”196 Furthermore, Franck’s
analysis of this issue emphasizes the “penalties side” of social pressures, rather than
social rewards or cognitive impulses to conform. In that respect, precision may be a less
valuable tool under conditions in which social sanctions are underutilized, infeasible, or
expensive.
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The acculturation approach also suggests that precision will have less dramatic ex
ante effects on treaty negotiations—and other efforts at promulgating international legal
obligations. Many international legal scholars contend that establishing precise, strong
human rights obligations requires the approximation of a “world culture.” The existence
of a wide range of cultures, national histories, and material resources is thought to
confound efforts to fashion a global consensus. Indeed, some commentators even contend
that customary international law is chimerical: “With over 180 nations representing an
even larger number of cultures, international society lacks a reservoir of shared values or
a common ideology from which to derive and perceive norms. Shared values and
perceptions are essential to the formation of customary norms.”197 As an empirical matter,
however, remarkable levels of homogeneity exist across all states (in many issue areas
including education policy, science bureaucracies, development agendas, environmental
policy). As we have argued elsewhere, the patterns of policy convergence suggest the
existence of a global culture (or “global polity”).198 This global cultural system suggests
that some measure of precision is achievable, especially in areas related to globallyshared norms. These convergent tendencies in policy and structure suggest that treaty
negotiators (and nongovernmental organizations) can demand greater levels of precision
than persistent cross-national variations might suggest possible.

197
See, e.g., J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT 'L L. 449, 465
(2000).
198
See Goodman & Jinks, supra note __.
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Table III: Precision of Obligations
IMPORTANCE
Coercion

LOW
(predicts similar
outcome regardless of
precision or ambiguity
in formal obligation)

PRECISION
1. ex post: clear yardstick
– less room to deny or
contest violation

AMBIGUITY
1. ex ante: ambiguity
facilitates agreement

2. ex post: augments
reputational effects
3. ex post: creates focal
point

Persuasion

HIGH

1. ex post: significantly
lower degree of
compliance if not precise
-- not as serviceable
(must be sufficiently
precise to solve specific
problems)

1. ex post: generates
opportunity and need for
subsequent discussions
2. ex post: specific process
of applying rules to practices
propels communicative
process

2. ex post: higher levels
of compliance because
agreement is genuine and
reflects changed
preferences
3. ex ante: debate over
exact rule is productive
4. ex ante: higher levels
of agreement because
debate changes minds

Acculturation

HIGH

1. ex ante: predicts
broader zone of potential
agreement due to social
pressures
2. ex ante: predicts
broader zone of potential
agreement due to
existence of shared global
culture

1. ex post: predict high
degree of compliance despite
ambiguity (states are proven
to follow general, even
unstated, global models)
2. ex post: important to
reach broad consensus for
institutionalizing effects
3. ex ante: precision risks
overemphasizing
disagreement =
deinstitutionalizing

Socialization and Human Rights

45

IV. IMPLEMENTATION: MONITORING AND ENFORCEMENT
The final design issue we examine is how best to monitor and enforce compliance
with substantive regime rules. Admittedly, other design choices also bear on questions of
compliance and effectiveness. But the devices for monitoring and enforcement probably
have the most direct consequences for observance of regime rules. Existing options range
from “soft” to “hard” techniques. We discuss the following points along that spectrum:
1. Publishing best practices
examples: International Coordinating Committee for National Human Rights
Institutions;199 U.N. Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights;200
2. Monitoring and reporting
examples: Special Mechanisms under the U.N. Commission on Human
Rights;201 Inter-American Commission of Human Rights;202 periodic state
reports to international human rights treaty bodies;203
3. Criticizing bad actors
examples: Country Resolutions by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights;204
concluding observations by international human rights treaty bodies on state
periodic reports;205
199
The International Coordinating Committee is an umbrella organization representing national-level
human rights institutions (e.g., commissions and ombudsmen). The Committee has developed, along with the
High Commissioner for Human Rights, a guide of best practices for national human rights institutions.
<www.nhri.net/pdf/ICCProcedureEng2002.pdf> (last visited September 23, 2003).
200
The Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights is the main subsidiary body of
the U.N. Commission on Human Rights. The Sub-Commission is comprised of 26 independent experts who
meet annually to undertake studies and make recommendations on thematic issue areas. The SubCommission has assisted in the development of best practices related to prevention of trafficking in women,
conscientious objection to military service, and human rights standards for corporations.
<www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/2/sc.htm> (last visited September 23, 2003).
201
The Commission on Human Rights appoints independent individuals (special rapporteurs) or a group of
individuals (a working group) to address specific country situations (e.g., Burma/Myanmar) or thematic
issues (e.g., torture). They examine, monitor, advise, and publicly report on human rights situations in
specific states and on types of human rights violations across different states.
<www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/2/mechanisms.htm> (last visited September 23, 2003).
202
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights is a permanent organ of the Organization of
American States. The mandate of the Commission includes conducting on-site visits to investigate specific
situations and publishing special reports regarding human rights conditions in a particular state.
<www.cidh.oas.org/what.htm> (last visited September 23, 2003).
203
The six principal human rights treaties each require state parties to submit a period report to a
supervisory organ, called a “treaty body,” which reviews the state’s compliance with the treaty obligations.
See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note __, at art. 40 (“The States Parties to
the present Covenant undertake to submit reports on the measures they have adopted which give effect to the
rights recognized herein and on the progress made in the enjoyment of those rights.”).
204
See supra note __ (describing Commission on Human Rights). The Commission on Human Rights is
empowered to adopt resolutions criticizing a UN member state in “situations which reveal a consistent
pattern of violations of human rights.” S.C. Res. 1235, U.N. ESCOR, 42nd Sess., Supp. No. 1, 1479th plen.
mtg. at 17, U.N. Doc E/4393 (1967).
205
The concluding observations of a treaty body provide a collective assessment of a state’s periodic
report. Concluding observations commonly include a declaration of factors impeding the application of the
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4. Binding decisions and material sanctions
examples: European Court of Human Rights;206 International Criminal Court207
Scholars also offer variations on existing structures. Laurence Helfer and Anne-Marie
Slaughter, for example, propose institutional changes to make treaty bodies appear and
act more like courts.208 Harold Koh emphasizes the importance of increasing
transnational adjudication.209 Jack Goldsmith and Stephen Krasner stress that economic
and military force would best promote human rights,210 and they question whether new
institutions (the International Criminal Court) and new doctrines (humanitarian
intervention) support or undermine the maximum use of that power.211 Notably, these
projects share the sense that the options we list above reflect a continuum of
effectiveness. Compliance is best induced by the exercise of coercive authority—such as
military intervention or the binding decision of third-party monitoring institutions. This
view, we maintain, is called into question by the acculturation approach. Indeed, we posit
that, under certain conditions, “soft law” mechanisms will be more effective in
establishing durable norms.
It is important to isolate the three mechanisms of social influence in examining this
set of design issues. One might mistakenly suppose that exploiting a range of tactics—
without having to delve into finer details of mechanisms and behavioral logics—is a
pragmatically sound approach. However, this response is riddled with problems. First,
and perhaps most obviously, effective regime design often requires setting priorities and
making tough choices with limited resources. Accordingly, enforcement decisions should
be based on a comparison of the expected efficiency—the probability for achieving
behavioral change—of each option. 212 Second, the features of the three mechanisms
reveal potential incompatibilities between strategies. For example, as we discuss below,
some forms of coercion would undercut strategies for fostering acculturation; that is,
coercive tactics can have a de-institutionalizing effect. Some of these conflicts can be
managed, while others are more fundamental. Third, the central practical concerns of
specific strategic options vary by social logic. For example, the persuasion approach is
treaty and criticism of specific practices. <http://web.amnesty.org/pages/treaty-periodic-reports-eng> (last
visited September 23, 2003).
206
Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights are binding. Responsibility for supervising the
execution of judgments lies with the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, which verifies
whether the state has taken adequate remedial measures to comply with the Court’s decision.
<www.echr.coe.int> (last visited September 23, 2003).
207
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 77, July 17, 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF. 183/9, 37
I.L.M. 999.
208
Helfer & Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, supra note __.
209
See Koh, supra note __, at 2599; Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV.
181 (1996).
210
Jack Goldsmith, Sovereignty, International Relations Theory, and International Law, 52 STAN. L. REV.
959, 979 (2000); Krasner, Sovereignty, Regimes, and Human Rights, supra note __.
211
Goldsmith & Krasner, The Limits of Idealism, 132 DAEDALUS 47 (Winter 2003); Jack Goldsmith, The
Self-Defeating International Criminal Court, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 89 (2003).
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Studying mechanisms of social influence may also help assess the likelihood that states will resort to
one strategy or another. For example, Chayes and Chayes reject several coercive strategies not because the
respective approach would be ineffective if deployed, but because they conclude that the prospects of states
using it are dim. See Chayes & Chayes, supra note __, at 63-65.
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most concerned about “over-legalization” by third-party monitoring institutions.213 Other
concerns that vary by behavioral logic include the informational politics employed by
various strategies—including the type and timing of disclosures.214 In short, sensible
regime design must carefully consider the three social mechanisms when fashioning
implementation strategies.215
A. Coercion
Under the coercion approach, traditional notions of power—military and
economic—provide the principal machinery for changing state practices. Treaty regimes
discourage undesirable behavior by increasing its costs (or, alternatively, encourage
desirable behavior by rewarding its practice). On this view, the best prospects for
orchestrating change include establishing “agreements with teeth” (e.g., the International
Criminal Court, the U.N. Security Council) and arrangements that link human rights
performance to financial and military interests (e.g., conditional U.S. security assistance;
good governance requirements for World Bank loans).
The coercion approach does not highly value strategies such as publishing best
practices or monitoring and reporting human rights abuses—except insofar as these
strategies are integrated into some coercive apparatus. Publishing “best practices,” for
example, might serve to establish a focal point, around which coercive measures can be
organized—in other words, these focal points might help regime participants identify
good and bad actors. However, utilizing “best practices” in this manner probably
contradicts the informal character of their promulgation216 and ignores the fact that they
represent a prospective ideal.217 Indeed, tying “best practices” to coercive strategies
would frustrate the relaxed political process through which such standards are generally
drafted, endorsed, and promoted. Monitoring and reporting are also valuable—if
connected to coercive tools. They might generate information according to which rewards
and penalties could be directed. Linking information about state practices to coercive
213

See Laurence R. Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights, 102 COLUM . L. REV. 1832 (2002).
Cf. Mitchell, supra note __ (describing different type and timeliness of information required by various
nonproliferation strategies).
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Understanding the potential of different logics can also help identify important, incidental social effects
of a design choice. For example, coercive devices—such as binding decisions by supranational institutions—
may most effectively produce social change through their non-coercive effects (such as helping to frame
issues). Evaluating their utility should thus take into account predicted outcomes—not simply express
objectives such as deterrence and raising costs of proscribed behavior. This lens reveals how NGO strategies
that may appear naïve—such as constructing tribunals to deter tyrants or advocating that regime principles
apply equally to powerful liberal states—could reflect more sophisticated understandings of symbolic politics
than critics give them credit. See Goldsmith & Krasner, supra note __ (criticizing the political platforms of
human rights NGOs with respect to constructing international criminal tribunals); Jack Goldsmith, The SelfDefeating International Criminal Court, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 99-101 (2003).
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The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has sometimes assumed responsibility for
compiling and publishing best practices in the human rights field. The Office of the U.N. Secretary-General
has undertaken similar initiatives, as well as the Sub-Commission on the Protection and Promotion of Human
Rights. Each of these bodies is notably comprised of U.N. administrative officials or independent experts, not
states. These institutions accordingly lend themselves to informal, less politicized processes.
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Cf. Christopher McCrudden, Human Rights Codes For Transnational Corporations: The Sullivan and
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INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 418 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000).
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tactics, however, can also force information underground. Indeed, coercive strategies
might provide states with incentives to conceal the very types of information most useful
to the persuasion or acculturation approach.
The coercion approach also considers “official” criticism to be largely
unimportant. As a direct coercive technique, criticism constitutes a nominal sanction. It
is, indeed, difficult to conceive of its net benefit once transaction costs are taken into
account. Nevertheless, depending on the nature of the institutions responsible for levying
criticism, the practice may help to delineate proscribed behavior. For example, Abbott
and Snidal explain that states may promulgate relatively general directives due to ex ante
contracting costs, and thus designate institutions to elaborate more specific rules.218 The
creation of a formal body to criticize state performance—and thereby apply legal
obligations to practice—can serve this process of elaboration. Additionally, depending on
the composition of the institution, graduated criticism might convey useful information to
a targeted state in order for it to reorient its practices. Specifically, graduated criticism
might signal the existence of a political commitment to employ coercive power.219 Of
course, this kind of purpose suggests that official criticism be used judiciously—to
maintain the credibility of threats over time. The important point is that this
understanding of official criticism is inconsistent with tactics of persuasion and
acculturation, which rely on more liberal or sweeping use of criticism (e.g., to bring
attention to events or to facilitate the process of institutionalizing norms).
B. Persuasion
Under the persuasion approach, so-called “managerialism”220 is the central medium
for promoting regime objectives. Generally, human rights regimes can encourage
desirable behavior in two ways: (1) by systematically engaging governments in
discussion about controversial practices; and (2) by fostering structural opportunities for
transnational networks to engage governments (or relevant domestic audiences). On this
view, states can be convinced to embrace regime norms (1) through organizational
arrangements that facilitate meaningful communicative exchanges among stakeholders
(e.g., the International Labor Organization221); and (2) through the exercise of “good
offices” by high-level officials (e.g., the High Commissioner on National Minorities of
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe222).
218

See Abbott & Snidal, supra note __, at 433-34.
As an illustration, the U.N. Security Council has adopted a routine of using deliberately graduated
language in a series of resolutions, before activating its more powerful enforcement authority.
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Raustiala & Slaughter, supra note __, at 542 (“The theory was ‘managerial’ in that it rejected sanctions
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In accordance with this approach, monitoring and reporting can induce change if
conducted in a sensitive manner. Some persuasion scholars recommend these strategies
as means of generating useful information and cooperative solutions. Chayes and Chayes,
for example, discuss the usefulness of alerting states of potential defections so as to direct
attention to managing such situations.223 Some also discuss the significance of periodic
state reports in which they assess actual practices under the terms of the treaty. The open
exchange of ideas and experiences assists “the winnowing out of reasonably justifiable or
unintended failures to fulfill commitments … and the identification and isolation of the
few cases of egregious and willful violation.”224 Furthermore, monitoring and reporting
can serve an important function in cuing states to think harder about human rights
violations—another valuable ingredient in the persuasion process.225 Accordingly,
international organizations could create institutional environments in which new
information (e.g., about the type or prevalence of human rights violations) is routinely
and systematically linked to broadly established values. In contrast, a second variant of
the persuasion scholarship suggests that regimes do not have to emphasize exposing state
practices. External surveillance is considered less important because the dominant social
influence is based on sincere agreement with the content of the rules.226 Nevertheless,
disclosures that reveal new types and patterns of violations are independently important
in that they “change minds” about the significance and prevalence of human rights
violations. These views, in turn, help mobilize (and organize) responses at a systemic
level. And finally, as we discussed above, some of this scholarship recommends
strategies not clearly linked to the persuasion-centered causal account—indeed, they
seem to rely on coercion or acculturation processes. For example, some commentators
suggest social sanctions will gradually compel states to narrow the gap between positiontaking and actual practice. 227
Less clear in the persuasion model are the effectiveness of criticism and sanctions.
The literature is ambivalent on these issues. One school of thought maintains that
criticism and more severe penalties can compliment efforts at persuasion. Another
maintains that these forces are incongruous or contradictory. As for the first perspective,
the prospect of forceful measures if persuasive strategies collapse energizes and deepens
cooperative endeavors (indeed it may also bring states to the table in the first place). 228
Moreover, some scholarship stresses the importance of persuasion but finds its greatest
compliance with international law.”); id. at 695 (“The work of the High Commissioner shows the salience of
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impact in encouraging transnational political movements and foreign states to leverage
concessions from recalcitrant states.229 In sharp contrast, other scholarship argues that
criticism and more severe penalties have a deleterious effect on the communicative
atmosphere required for collective deliberation to thrive.230 Criticism may, therefore, also
discourage states from systematically reviewing new types and patterns of human rights
violations.231
C. Acculturation
The acculturation approach suggests different techniques for changing state practices.
Central to this perspective is that it understands power as productive, cultural, and
diffuse—not merely prohibitory, material, and centralized. Treaty regimes can induce
desirable behavior through processes that institutionalize models of legitimate state
practice; and by linking states and their citizenry to forums that elaborate and apply such
standards. On this view, regimes should carry out a number of activities: direct available
resources to assist states in reporting on their own human rights practices (e.g., under
Article 40 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights); facilitate
transnational experts in human rights consultancy (e.g., technical and advisory services of
the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights); and create local “receptor sites”
for transmitting global norms (e.g., establishing and strengthening national human rights
commissions).
Compared with the other approaches, the acculturation approach more highly values
the publication of best practices. Admittedly, the general approach does not suggest
relying heavily on this method. Nevertheless, publishing best practices can contribute to
the process of standardization. States may be more willing to adopt such models, at faster
rates and more durably, than the other approaches suggest. The emulation of best
practices will not require persuading relevant actors. And state policies that “mimic” best
practices should also be more durable than policy shifts caused by coercion—the policies
should generally persist even when material pressure is no longer applied or available.
Monitoring and reporting can also perform valuable functions in a regime that takes
acculturation seriously. However, these devices should be used differently depending on
the form of acculturation being harnessed. Here, it is necessary to distinguish again
between the two types of acculturation: conformity produced through social rewards and
sanctions and conformity produced through cognitive pressures.232 With respect to the
first type, it is vital to expose wrongdoing (and tie that exposure to external praise and
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criticism). Accordingly, external surveillance and reporting—especially by third-party
states and organizations—should be significant parts of the apparatus.233
With respect to the second type of acculturation, monitoring and reporting serve
different functions. States will formally adopt particular conventions even under
conditions of non-surveillance. That is, they will accede to particular norms in the
process of identity formation and mimicking globally promulgated models. External
monitoring and reporting are thus not necessarily required (a factor in considering where
to expend limited resources). Nevertheless, visibility might perform a regulatory
function. Indeed, the leading social theorist on discursive practices, Michel Foucault,
emphasized the power of visibility in regulating social behavior.234 A regime that tried to
exploit these attributes might stress reporting by a state’s own organs, not simply
reporting by third parties. Indeed, the very process of identifying, describing, and
controlling human rights practices helps the diffusion of the human rights discourse
through global and local levels. This general approach, however, would need to be
careful not to “institutionalize noncompliance.” As suggested by recent studies of
domestic order maintenance, 235 international regimes should be concerned that
emphasizing the prevalence of violations might promote disorder and further
violations.236
Under certain conditions, binding third-party decisions and material sanctions may
weaken the effectiveness of acculturation. Cognitive dissonance studies suggest that
subtle forms of socialization can be undermined by the simultaneous presence of
instrumental threats and promises.237 Actors are more willing to embrace a practice or
idea if they consider the decision to comply an act of personal choice (intrinsic
motivation), rather than compelled by external force (extrinsic motivation). However, the
233
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applicability of this theory to states (either at the macro-level of states or the micro-level
of diplomats, elites, domestic publics) is questionable. Additionally, once norms are
internalized, more intrusive (and perhaps coercive) measures are legitimated (e.g., the
European Court of Human Rights).
Table IV: Mechanisms of Implementation
PUBLISHING
BEST
PRACTICES

MONITORING
& REPORTING

CRITICIZING
BAD ACTORS

BINDING
DECISIONS &
SANCTIONS

Coercion

Negligible

Effective (in
providing
information) if tied
to coercion

Negligible

Highly effective and
essential

Persuasion

Moderately
Effective

ONE VIEW:
Highly effective –
generates issue
salience
(e.g., change minds
regarding gravity
of problem)

Potentially effective
–generating issue
salience

Potentially
counterproductive –
creates incentive not to
reveal information

ANOTHER VIEW:
Moderately
important if already
agree on rule

Acculturation

Effective

Highly effective
and important
RISK:
Emphasizing
prevalence risks
institutionalizing
noncomplaince
(qua “Broken
Windows” research
on order
maintenance)

Potentially
counterproductive –
deleterious impact
on communicative
atmosphere

Highly effective and
important:
mobilization of
shame

RISK:
“overlegalization”
(third-party adjudicator
exceeds states’
acceptance of
obligation)

Potentially
counterproductive –
creates incentive not to
reveal information
Potentially productive
if there are high levels
of institutionalization
RISK: Can undermine
institutionalization
(e.g., with cognitive
dissonance, coercive
force can undermine
acceptance)
RISK: Coercion
administered
inequitably (e.g., with
double standards or
shielding some states)
undercuts social
influence

Socialization and Human Rights

53

CONCLUSION
Regime design choices turn on empirical claims about how states behave and under
what conditions their behavior changes. We suggest that a central problem for human
rights regimes is how best to socialize “bad actors” to incorporate globally legitimated
models of state behavior and how to get “good actors” to do better. Substantial empirical
evidence suggests three distinct mechanisms whereby states and institutions might
influence the behavior of other states: coercion, persuasion, and acculturation. Several
structural impediments preclude full institutionalization of coercion- and persuasionbased regimes in human rights law. Yet, inexplicably these models of behavioral
modification predominate in international legal studies. In this Article, we first unpack
the components of each mechanism. We then link each of the identified mechanisms of
social influence to specific regime design characteristics—identifying several ways in
which acculturation might occasion a rethinking of fundamental regime design problems
in human rights law. Through a systematic evaluation of three design problems—
conditional membership, precision of obligations, and enforcement methods—we identify
and elaborate a “third way” to conceive of regime design problems. We maintain that (1)
acculturation is a conceptually distinct social process through which state behavior is
influenced; and (2) the regime design recommendations issuing from this approach defy
conventional wisdom in international human rights scholarship. This exercise not only
recommends reexamination of policy debates in human rights law; it also provides a
conceptual framework within which the costs and benefits of various design principles
might be assessed. Our aim is to improve the understanding of how norms operate in
international society with a view to improving the capacity of global and domestic
institutions to harness the processes through which human rights cultures are built.
In this Article, our principal objectives have been to analyze the characteristics of
each mechanism of social influence and to demonstrate their significance for institutional
design. The empirically-grounded conceptual structure offered here will, we hope, assist
future research agendas in international legal scholarship—empirical, conceptual, and
doctrinal. Toward that end, we offer, in conclusion, some provisional comments about the
prospects for developing an integrated model of social mechanisms. That is, having now
analyzed the micro-processes that comprise each mechanism, we can look toward a fully
integrated approach—one that accounts for all three mechanisms—in fashioning a human
rights regime.
Building an effective global human rights regime, in our view, will require an
empirically-grounded, integrated model that appreciates the distinct qualities of, and
interactions between, the various micro-processes. We identify some general features that
such a model should include. First, the model should take seriously the processes of
acculturation. Indeed, acculturation has been systematically undervalued (and, at times,
misunderstood) in debates about human rights regimes. As discussed above,
commentators rarely invoke acculturation; and, when they do, it is often either (1)
conflated with persuasion or (2) unexplained. Yet, the acculturation approach is
potentially quite useful in the context of human rights law. As we mentioned in the
Introduction, there are several reasons to suspect that the other mechanisms will prove
ineffective in this arena. States generally lack sufficient interest or political will to sustain
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an effective strategy of coercion. Persuasion approaches require “internalization” of the
values of the regime—and there is little evidence to suggest that this is a reliable method
of socializing bad actors. Indeed, theories of persuasion do not provide a useful way to
think about partial or incomplete internalization. In short, we should expect that
prevailing approaches—coercion and persuasion—will prove ineffective in the human
rights issue area. Furthermore, as the analysis of membership rules demonstrates,
acculturation strategies greatly value the social effects generated by intergovernmental
organizations. In contrast, both coercion and persuasion operate quite effectively outside
formal organizational settings.
Second, an integrated model should account for negative interactions between the
three mechanisms. Simply put, deploying one mechanism might undermine the ability to
deploy another. For example, overt coercion can interfere with persuasion strategies by
polarizing group deliberations. Coercion might also undercut acculturation by suggesting
that the target behavior is not self-evidently appropriate—the “deinstitutionalization”
effect we described above. 238 Persuasion and acculturation may also countermand one
another if the former focuses attention on resolving particular substantive disagreements
between states when the latter has reason to stress abstract commonalities. Persuasion and
acculturation strategies may also conflict when the former highlights the prevalence of
human rights violations as a framing device and the latter casts such violations as
anomalous in order to avoid the institutionalization of undesirable behavior.
Third, an integrated model should endeavor to identify the conditions under
which the various mechanisms operate successfully. For example, the effectiveness of the
mechanisms will likely vary by socio-economic and socio-political conditions of the
relevant states. In particular, it is important to assess the structural capacities of states to
monitor human rights practices and sanction human rights violations. The likelihood,
feasibility, and costs of these measures will often determine which strategy (or strategies)
should predominate. Another important variable is the character of the extant structural
relations at the global or regional level. For example, we should expect that the
effectiveness of various mechanisms will turn on considerations such as: the density of
inter-national interactions, the axes along which relevant states share important cultural
characteristics (including religion, ethnicity, and language), and the distribution of
military and economic power.
Finally, an integrated model should consider various “sequencing” effects. That
is, an integrated model might emphasize different mechanisms at different stages of the
institutionalization of a norm. For example, there may be reason to coerce states into
formal organizations in which they are later subject to measures that rely on persuasion or
acculturation. If acculturation can alter state preferences over time, intergovernmental
organizations might incorporate more flexible administrative devices such as
renegotiation clauses—essentially devices that are attentive to the fact that the
preferences of states may be systematically influenced by their very participation in the
organization. These insights suggest a human rights regime might also enhance its
effectiveness by demanding modest initial commitments and ratcheting up obligations
238
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over time. More specifically, strategies could include allowing supervisory organs to
expand their authority incrementally and creating opportunities for optional protocols
only after the organization has existed for a certain period of time. Under certain
conditions, a regime might concentrate on exploiting the effects of acculturation before
investing heavily in persuasive techniques to define obligations more precisely. Human
rights regimes can also potentially employ coercive techniques most effectively once
robust levels of internalization have occurred. This is, in many respects, the evolutionary
path of the European Convention on Human Rights.
These reflections on the general contours of an integrated model are, we
recognize, provisional. The full elaboration of an integrated model will require further
empirical and conceptual work. Nevertheless, we contend that this work should be guided
by a few basic points. First, the project of building an effective international human rights
regime will be stymied if the micro-processes of social influence are not taken into
account. And, second, considerable attention must be given to the force of acculturation.
International human rights regimes, at bottom, seek to influence state practice through the
elaboration of global models of legitimate state behavior. In our view, this is, in many
respects, a social process. Regime design in human rights law must then seek to
incorporate what we know about: global culture, the diffusion of practices within and
across societies, and the processes of social influence more generally. This Article is, we
hope, a step in that direction.

